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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
SEXUAL OFFENDER RESIDENCY ISSUES AND RECIDIVISM
IN SOUTH FLORIDA
by
Joelle Amanda Lee-Silcox
Florida International University, 2020
Miami, Florida
Professor Jamie L. Flexon, Major Professor
This paper explores registered sexual offender (RSO) residency restrictions, unintended
consequences of these restrictions, including clustering, shared sub-culture, and
recidivism within the Tri-County area of Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach
Counties of Florida. While Florida Statute 775.215 (FLRR) bans RSOs from living
within 1,000 feet of any school, childcare facility, park, or playground, individual county
and municipal ordinances add-on to these boundaries, effectively banishing some RSOs
to slivers of land in clusters. These clusters often settle in socially disorganized
neighborhoods that lack informal control, needed treatment and rehabilitative services,
and are located away from family and employment opportunities. Through the use of
ArcGIS Pro 2.4.2, SPSS 26.0, and HLM 8.0, this paper examines variables associated
with violating FLRR, whether or not RSOs in the Tri-County area live in socially
disorganized communities, and what effect clustering and homelessness contribute to the
recidivism of RSOs. Using FLRR as a guideline, 41% of RSOs in the Tri-County area
that violate buffer zones are less likely to be classified as sexual predators, have victims
under 18, and are homeless. Furthermore, for every one unit increase in socially
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disorganized areas, groups of clustered RSOs are 118% more likely to cluster within
those areas. Lastly, the probability of recidivism for a transient RSO to be rearrested
increases by 209% over those who reside in a home, and those RSOs who live in a cluster
are 14% more likely to recidivate. These unintended consequences of sex offender
residency restrictions laws created through a perpetual state of moral panic provide a
false sense of security for the public and exacerbate an already complex issue.
Keywords: sexual offender, residency restrictions, transient offenders, social
disorganization, unintended consequences, moral panic, subculture theory, inverse
weighted distance, hierarchical linear modeling, synthetic clusters, Florida, Broward,
Miami-Dade, Palm Beach
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A handful of publicized cases concerning registered sexual offenders (RSOs) and
their residential placement within the community has driven lawmakers to pass heavy
residential restrictions on RSOs (Levenson & Cotter, 2005b). For example, Florida State
Statute 775.215 (FLRR), residency restrictions for a person convicted of certain sex
offenses, restricts RSOs from residing within 1,000 feet of schools, parks, playgrounds,
or childcare facilities (Florida Department of Law Enforcement [FDLE], 2015).
However, within each county (e.g., Miami-Dade and Broward Counties) and city more
restrictive requirements are often imposed by ordinance to 2,500 feet of schools, parks,
playgrounds, childcare facilities, bus stops, libraries, and other locations children are
likely to congregate (Broward County Sheriff's Office [BSO], 2015). These state and
local ordinances were passed to protect potential victims, mostly children, by prohibiting
RSOs contact with target-rich environments (Agan & Prescott, 2014). Even though there
have been countless studies which state that excessive residency restrictions exacerbate
and create “danger zones” of clustered sex offenders, counties and cities are continuing to
pass more stringent residency requirements (Duwe, 2009; Levenson et al., 2013; Skipp &
Campo-Flores, 2009; Wartell, 2009; Wilson, 2009).
On November 5, 2015, Florida included over 70,000 RSOs on the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) registry (FDLE, 2015). Once confined, dead,
and deported RSOs were removed from this list, about 47,000 RSOs remained (FDLE,
2015). Approximately 4% of those offenders were transient or had absconded, making it
difficult for law enforcement to find and maintain tabs on this specific population (FDLE,
2015). Nevertheless, with additions to FLRR by counties and municipalities creating
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more stringent residency restrictions, transient offenders who try to abide by these
restrictions live on the street, often being displaced and upheaved from one neighborhood
to another (CBS Miami, 2012; Lantigua, 2009; Levenson et al., 2013; Linhardt, 2009;
McCoy, 2014; Rabin et al., 2013). Within the past ten years in South Florida, city
officials and law enforcement displaced RSOs from living under a bridge or on a street
corner in deplorable conditions, exposed to the elements (CBS Miami, 2012; Duwe,
2009; Hanks, 2018; Levenson et al., 2013; Levenson & Cotter, 2005b; Linhardt, 2009;
McCoy, 2014; Odzer & Hamacher, 2012; Rabin, 2014; Rabin et al., 2013; Reutter, 2015;
Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009; The Huffington Post, 2012). After local politicians
created parks and changed residency restrictions to practically ban RSOs from living in
their communities, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) stepped in and sued the
local governments on behalf of RSOs (Hanks, 2018; Hearne, 2015).
Adding to this ever-growing high profile regarding the treatment of sex offenders
in Florida, several award-winning documentaries portrayed these sex offender enclaves.
Sundance Film Fest winner in 2015, the documentary Pervert Park (Barkfors & Barkfors,
2015) depicted 120 RSOs, their life, and struggle to live in a mobile home park in St.
Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida (Sundance Institute, 2016). The film put a spotlight
on Florida’s RSOs again. As the winner of the Albert Maysles New Documentary
Director award, Feige uncovers layers of hurt, anger, and confusion surrounding South
Florida RSO residence restrictions and the powerful lobbyists behind these laws in
Untouchable (2016). With Banished (Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018), The Marshall
Project adds to the ever-growing illustration that in South Florida, RSO’s living
conditions are deplorable, often resorting to living in makeshift shacks, tents, and in their

2

cars at night. While the public’s reaction might be unsympathetic, academics and law
enforcement officers warn the blowback of this destabilization in living environments for
RSOs may manifest in the form of clustering, recidivism, and transience, all of which
diminish public safety at large (Barnes et al., 2009, Casady, 2009; Minnesota Department
of Corrections [MNDOC], 2003).
Currently, a lacuna exists in the literature regarding addressing the totality of this
issue within major urban areas like Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties in
Florida. Given this dearth of critical information, this study aims to measure if RSOs
residing in this Tri-County area are violating FLRR by living within 1,000 feet of a
school, childcare facility, park, or playground, establish if clusters of RSOs fall within
criminogenic, socially disorganized areas, and determine if these clusters increase the rate
of recidivism by promoting a subculture of deviance within socially disorganized areas,
both of which are critical factors to recidivism within several studies (Chamberlain &
Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2015).

State and Federal Laws
Given the moral panic surrounding the laws that govern restrictions, permissible
areas to live, and the resulting clusters of RSOs that emerge as a result of these laws,
studying the unintended consequences of these policies behooves the public and
policymakers. Toward this end, a comprehensive look at the history of residency
restrictions, laws, and changes over time leads to a greater understanding of public outcry
and sentiment surrounding sexual offenders and the progression of these laws on a state
and federal level. While there is a multitude of laws about sex offenders, below are the
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foremost and salient federal and state laws about RSOs. The review of such will provide
significant context to nest the current investigation.
Before 1994, few states required sex offenders to register addresses with local law
enforcement offices. That would all change in the passing of the Jacob Wetterling Act, a
federal law that began with the highly publicized kidnapping, sexual molestation, and
murder of Jacob Erwin Wetterling by a stranger, Danny James Heinrich, on October 22,
1989, in Minnesota. During the initial investigation regarding the kidnapping of Jacob,
law enforcement shared with Jacob's mom, Patty Wetterling, that a suspect list,
resembling a sexual offender registry, would assist in the initial search and questioning of
suspects (Lehrer, 2016). These events, and through Mrs. Wetterling’s lobbying efforts,
led Minnesota to establish the first public sex-offender state registry (Lehrer, 2016).
Three years later, in 1994, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offenders Registration Act passed Congress. The Jacob Wetterling Act
constructed rules for tracking sex offenders by states. It required states to monitor the
residency of sex offenders annually for ten years after their release, or in the case of
violent sex crimes, RSOs would need to update their residence every three months for the
rest of their lives (Department of Justice [DOJ], n.d.).
As an amendment to the Jacob Wetterling Act and passed in 1996, Megan’s Law
requires law enforcement to notify the community regarding the residences of RSOs and
publishes these records on the internet (DOJ, n.d.; Lehrer, 2016). Megan’s Law named
memorially for the child victim, Megan Kanaka. In 1994, a neighbor, previously
convicted of sexual offenses against children, raped and murdered Megan. Considering
the tragic events involving their daughter, the Kanakas lobbied to reform laws regarding
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sex offenders citing the lack of public knowledge that a sex offender lived in their
neighborhood; and therefore, the Kanakas were uninformed and unprepared to protect
their family (Corrigan, 2006; Jerome & Eftimiades, 1995). Under this law, each state
determines what information (name, picture, address, offense, etc.) is made publicly
available, as well as how community members would receive the information. (DOJ,
n.d.).
Under FLRR, law enforcement agencies in Florida, such as the county or city
police, are given the discretion to notify the public of sexual predators’ residences in a
manner they choose toward facilitating public protection (The Florida Legislature, 2015).
FDLE maintains and publishes a public registry of sexual offenders and predators in all
counties in Florida, including the following information: first, middle, and last names,
incarceration status, predator or offender status, sex, race, hair and eye colors, height,
weight, birth date, permanent, temporary, and transient addresses, if the victim was a
minor, and pictures of the offenders (FDLE, 2015). For example in Collier County,
Florida, the Collier County Sheriff’s Office uses multiple avenues to deliver community
notification besides the internet such as distributing a bulletin with the offender
information with their name, photo, and address to school resource officers, district patrol
deputies, licensed daycares within a one-mile radius of the offender’s address, residents
of the neighborhood where the offender will reside, public and private schools, bus
drivers, and to the local news media to be broadcast (Collier County Sheriff's Office,
2018). In other Florida counties, like Bradford, the Bradford County Police Department
installed large red signs outside of homes where sexual predators reside under the
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umbrella of following the public notification clause within FLRR and Megan’s Law
(Tate, 2013).
In September 1995, South Florida news headlined stories about the kidnapping,
violent sexual battery, murder, and subsequent dismemberment of nine-year-old Jimmy
Ryce by a stranger. His death and its circumstances prompted an outcry for justice and
additional constraints for sexual predators (Presley, 1999). The Florida Legislature passed
and enacted the Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent
Predators’ Treatment and Care Act, also known as the Jimmy Ryce Act in 1998. This Act
provides that sexual offenders, even upon release from incarceration, can be indefinitely
detained in custody for further evaluation and, if deemed that they posed a risk for reoffense, civilly committed (Correct Care Solutions, n.d.). Currently, these offenders
awaiting civil commitment trials reside in Arcadia, Florida, at the Florida Civil
Commitment Center (Correct Care Solutions, n.d.). As of 2014, over 70 men at this
Center await civil commitment trials, some waiting ten years for their trial (Salzhauer &
Gordon, 2014).
In early 2005, in Central Florida, nine-year-old Jessica Lunsford was taken from
her home, raped, and buried alive by a sexually recidivistic career criminal. Jessica’s
father, Mark Lunsford, lobbied for and helped pass the Jessica Lunsford Act or Jessica’s
Law in the Florida legislature in Florida in late 2005, as well as in forty states
subsequently (Frank, 2010). Jessica's Law instituted a mandatory sentence of twenty-five
years for those committing specific sexual acts against children up to eleven years old
(Hawke, 2005). It also requires sexual predators to register biannually and lifetime
electronic monitoring for certain offenders (Hawke, 2005). Additionally, the Act called
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for background screenings for non-employees, i.e., contractors working at schools
(FDLE, 2018a).
Daughter of one of the most influential lobbyists in Florida, Lauren Book, was
molested by her nanny for six years. Once Ron Book, Lauren’s father, found out about
the abuse, he went on a crusade to increase sex offender residency restrictions. The
Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance, or Lauren's Law, passed in 2005. It creates a
2,500-foot buffer zone around any school, thus prohibiting sexual predators and offenders
from having victims under the age of 16 from residing within that area (The Lauren Book
Child Safety Ordinance, 2005). Also, RSOs are restricted from being in a county or city
park or childcare center when a minor under sixteen years old is present unless the RSO
is the parent or guardian of a child in the park or dropping or picking up their child
enrolled at the facility (The Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance, 2005). Soon after its
passage, over 60 other municipalities and counties in Florida followed suit by creating
2,500-foot restrictions, a substantial expansion from the state statute of 1,000-foot
residency restriction surrounding schools, parks, playgrounds, public bus stops or
childcare facilities (FDLE, 2015; Reischel, 2006; Skipp, 2009). ACLU continues to fight
Miami-Dade County and other cities in the Tri-County area, given the lack of allowable
living locations under the sex offender residency restrictions (SORRs), and the resulting
inhumane living conditions that transient RSOs dwell in attributable to the SORRs
(Hearne, 2015).
In another Florida connection, on July 27, 2006, the 25th anniversary of the
abduction of six-year-old Adam Walsh from Hollywood Mall located in Hollywood,
Florida, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act or Sex
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Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). In effect and historically, SORNA
became the most comprehensive legislation regarding sexual offenders. Title 1 of
SORNA revised the state’s implementation of registration and notification (DOJ, n.d.).
SORNA increased jurisdiction to federally-recognized Indian tribes, expanded the
number of sex offenses that must be maintained through registration, retroactively
applied several provisions, and launched the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing,
Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART Office) within the
Department of Justice to help further and support states with this revised system (DOJ,
n.d.). Unlike previous iterations of laws about sex offenders, failure to comply with
SORNA by 2010, came with a hefty price - losing up to 10% of a state’s Omnibus Crime
federal funding:
For any fiscal year after the end of the period for implementation, a
jurisdiction that fails, as deemed by the Attorney General, to substantially
implement this subchapter shall not receive 10 percent of the funds that
would otherwise be allocated for that fiscal year to the jurisdiction under
subpart 1 of part E of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3750 et seq.) (2006, p. 8248).
However, to date, only 17 states (including Florida), three territories, and 63 tribes
successfully satisfied the SORNA requirements (National Conference of State
Legislatures, 2014; Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehension,
Registration, and Tracking [SMARTb], 2018). Some states fail to comply because the
costly overhaul required for implementation is prohibitive (Lyons, 2011). While other
states’ lawmakers, such as those in Texas and California, declare they know how to
handle their RSOs without a federal mandate (Lyons, 2011).
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Since SORNA currently presides as the primary and dominant law regarding
RSOs, a more in-depth analysis is needed surrounding sections that govern registering
and monitoring sex offenders and each state's registry. For each state to be considered
SORNA compliant, they must follow guidelines within five areas related to registration
and notification of sex offenders: 1) mandated offenses and offenders to be included in
the sex offender registry, 2) states must track and penalize absconders from the sex
offender registry, 3) community notification must be put in place, 4) offender appearance
and verification checks must be conducted, and 5) states must share information across
law enforcement agencies (SMART, 2018a).
The first section of SORNA concentrates on offenses and offenders, specifically
the inclusion of juvenile crimes, state, tribe, territory, federal and military crimes, and
foreign country offenses (SMART, 2018a). Furthermore, the section mandates that each
state categorizes types of offenders according to the crimes committed by tier (Tier 1
being the on the lower end of serious crimes, and Tier 3 being the most severe), and adds
that before being released from incarceration, the RSO must register on the public
registry. Furthermore, SORNA mandates that states must retain the following registration
information for each RSO: name including nicknames, pseudonyms, ethnic or tribal
names, physical description including any identifying marks or tattoos, dates of birth –
reported and actual, social security number – real and any additional used by the RSO,
residential addresses that the RSO either resides at, will live at, or is most known to live
at, phone numbers including landline, cell phones, and any other phone number
habitually used by the RSO, and employment information such as name and address of
employer, school name and address. In addition to the items mentioned above, the state
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must also retain records about an RSO’s criminal history (dates of arrests, dates of
convictions, adjudication status, outstanding arrest warrants, DNA sample to be input into
the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), fingerprints, palm prints to be submitted to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) central database, photocopy of valid driver’s
license or identification, digitized copies of passports and immigration documents,
internet identifiers such as email addresses, instant messaging addresses or names, and
any other usernames or monikers used on the internet. Furthermore, the state must record
an RSO’s information about vehicle information for any land, air, or water motorized
vehicles, including license plate number, registration number, description, and temporary
or permanent locations of each vehicle, and a photograph of the RSO to be taken by law
enforcement every time the RSO makes an appearance. Additionally, SORNA and the
SMART office requires that states retroactively apply these standards to those previously
convicted (SMART, 2018a, p. 17).
Secondly, each state must try to track suspected absconders and those failing to
appear to register. State authorities can also inform local and federal law enforcement,
prosecutors, and the original jurisdiction in case the offender fails to appear to register
(SMART, 2018a). Each state, tribe, and territory is also required to operate a public
registry website (SMART, 2018a). Accordingly, the website must be current and post all
SORNA required offenders and their information. Offender information includes name
and aliases, residential address, employer address, school address, physical description,
photograph, the criminal history of sex offenses, current offense, vehicle information,
such as license plate number and vehicle description, is also included. The website allows
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for an email notification system to be used by the public when an RSO lives in or moves
out of a determined geographic range or zip code (SMART, 2018a).
In tracking offender verification and appearance, SORNA guidelines mandate that
for each tier of an offender, RSOs must make in-person appearances to law enforcement
agencies to reregister, take a current photograph, and verify information (SMART,
2018a). Tier 1 offenders must appear and register once a year for fifteen years, and Tier 2
offenders must appear and register every six months for twenty-five years. Tier 3
offenders are required to register every three months for the rest of their lives (SMART,
2018a).
Whenever an RSO registers or updates their registration, SORNA further requires
that each state must immediately notify each jurisdiction where the RSO will reside,
resides, is an employee or a student, or will be an employee or a student. Such notice
includes notifying local law enforcement, prosecutor offices, probation agencies, or any
other agency that conducts employment background checks (SMART, 2018a). Law
enforcement agencies completing community notifications within their jurisdictions
regarding the RSOs must also be notified (SMART, 2018a).
On May 18, 2010, the Department of Justice declared that Florida “substantially
implemented” SORNA, and as a result, would not be penalized because of compliance
with the federal mandate (Office of Justice Programs, 2010). In Florida, the job of
housing and maintaining the State’s Registry falls on the FDLE. Per SORNA guidelines,
FDLE hosts and maintains a website with RSO information (FDLE, 2015). Information
about RSOs including neighborhood searching capabilities of RSOs, absconded RSOs, a
subscription alert system regarding notification of RSOs within a given area, and a
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multitude of additional pages connected to the site regarding laws surrounding RSOs,
alerts, etc. is available (FDLE, 2018).
Maintaining and implementing changes to the Florida Sex Offender and Predator
Registry according to SORNA guidelines can be costly in time, money, and resources.
Recently, the Florida Legislature approved $7.1 million for the first of three upgrades to
the registry database maintained by FDLE (Ciabotti, Byrd, & Clark, 2018). Additionally,
each county or municipal law enforcement agency conducts at least one in-person address
verification per year per RSO (Ciabotti et al., 2018). In the cases of sexual predators, law
enforcement performs three or more in-person address verifications per year (Ciabotti et
al., 2018). Furthermore, RSOs must register with their local law enforcement agency
within 48 hours of release from prison. Depending upon their classification of either a
sexual offender or sexual predator, they are required to re-register two or four times a
year with their local law enforcement agency (FDLEb, 2018). If any information
changes, such as a vehicle, address, or any of the required fields as determined by
SORNA, RSOs must update their record; failure to do so can result in registry violation
with punishments ranging from fines to incarceration (Ciabotti et al., 2018). Also, some
law enforcement agencies charge RSOs fees to register ($19-$75), re-register ($5-$25),
and update their records ($5-$10); and failure to pay these fees results in sending the fine
to collections (Ciabotti et al., 2018). Transient offenders pose another level of investment
in time and resources for law enforcement agencies, as transient RSOs must check in
every thirty days with local law enforcement (Ciabotti et al., 2018). Conducting in-person
address checks prove difficult as transient offenders may be living in the woods or have
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their address listed as a street corner if they sleep on the sidewalk or under a bridge
(Ciabotti et al., 2018; Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018).
Another layer of SORNA compliance includes community notifications, which
law enforcement agencies deliver in several different ways, including, through their
website, distribution of posters or flyers, using third-party software like Offender Watch,
face-to-face conversations, emails, phone calls, and or letters (Ciabotti et al., 2018). In
addition to complying with SORNA, the Florida Department of Corrections (FLDOC),
State Attorney’s Office, Public Defender’s Office, local law enforcement, and in some
cases, treatment providers work to supervise an RSO’s probation, conditional release, and
community control supervision. These terms entail monitoring treatment, conducting
house, work, and electronics checks, electronic monitoring devices on RSOs, and
frequently working together to ensure the RSO fulfills all the conditions of release.
However, in most instances where the state attorney or public defender is required to
provide supervision, a lack of skills, staffing, and experience are a concern (Ciabotti et
al., 2018). Furthermore, in some counties, RSOs required to attend treatment facilities
might not have a provider within their county or cannot afford to pay for treatment, which
results in a violation of the terms of their release and is punishable by fines or jail time
(Ciabotti et al., 2018). While these costs allegedly aid in the prevention of future crimes
through deterrence, sex offender registration does not decrease sex crimes to minors or
reduce recidivism rates (Tewksbury et al., 2011). However, there likely is an increase in
violations related to compliance with SORNA and other ordinances designed to control
sex offenders.
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In addition to the state and existing severe county residency restrictions, on
January 23, 2018, Miami-Dade Commissioners passed an ordinance banning camping
within the county (Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners [MDBCC], 2018).
While most homeless can go to a shelter instead of being arrested when stopped by law
enforcement, because RSOs are not allowed to be in a shelter due to residency
restrictions, police can arrest RSOs for camping (MDBCC, 2018). Effectively, this law
bans transient RSOs from camping anywhere within Miami-Dade County under the
threat of arrest. Within the ordinance, the previous month’s meeting notes stipulate that
this ordinance was designed to eliminate an RSO enclave with over 230 RSOs camping
in an industrial area. Notably, Ron Book, Lauren Book’s father, lobbyist, and Chairman
of the Miami-Dade County Homeless Trust supported this ordinance and was outspoken
throughout the process, calling for the removal of the 230 RSOs from that area (MDBCC,
2018). Opponents argued that RSOs made transient through the law could contribute to
instability, absconding, or violation of FLRR, causing them to go back to jail and creating
an undue burden on law enforcement (MDBCC, 2018). While not overtly a law about sex
offenders, this ordinance unequivocally impacts the transient RSO population in MiamiDade County as transient RSOs face possible immediate arrest for camping within the
county (Gomes, 2017b).
Residency Restrictions in Florida
Laws stemming from heinous crimes committed against children, sex offender
residency restrictions (SORRs), dictate where sex offenders can reside. These SORRs
emerge from the concept of Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activities theory where a
target, motivated offender, and absence of a capable guardian allow for a crime to occur.
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The logic follows that if the target (i.e., a minor) no longer exists in the equation, then
crime will not happen. Also contributing to the philosophy behind SORRs, the idea of
distance decay asserts that proximity to an offender has a positive relationship to
victimization, meaning that the closer a possible target is to an offender, the higher the
chances of victimization (Rengert et al., 1999). However, SORRs only limit the time of
occupancy near these spaces between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., the time when
most children are asleep, and RSOs are free to roam about during the daytime.
Moreover, studies suggest that social proximity determines the selection of
victims and not residential or geographical vicinity (Duwe, 2015). Social or relationship
proximity concerns the relational distance between the offender and the victim. Proximity
relationships would include youth with a family friend, a single parent’s new boyfriend or
girlfriend, a babysitter, a trusted teacher, or a coach. Mostly, an offender in close social
proximity can have contact with a child to form a trusting bond. In the case of repetitive
abuse, sexual offenders can groom the child. Grooming looks like continuous access to
the child, start with appropriate behaviors and then escalates to inappropriate touching,
and the ability to reassure the victim that the behavior that they are engaging in is healthy
and enjoyable. Nevertheless, public outcry, stemming from a handful of cases, steered
focus and resources away from the most common contexts of sexual abuse (e.g., close
social or relational proximity) toward a call to create and enact laws restricting areas
where sex offenders can reside. This distorted orientation, then, reflects an inflated fear of
stranger sexual predators over the most common and likely victimization scenario, which
ultimately drives policy.
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FLRR restricts RSOs that committed acts against minors from residing within
1,000 feet of schools, parks, playgrounds, or childcare facilities (FDLE, 2015). However,
each county and city within the Tri-County area (Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm
Beach) impose additional SORRs through passing ordinances increasing SORRs ranging
from 1,500 to 2,500 feet of schools, parks, playgrounds, childcare facilities, bus stops,
libraries, and other locations children are likely to congregate (BSO, 2015). These
additional municipal ordinances started with the City of Miami Beach enacting a 2,500
feet SORR in 2005, which consequently prohibits RSOs from living there (Wernick,
2006). The City of Miami followed suit, and adjacent towns and neighborhoods received
an influx of RSOs and a cascading effect of “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) policies
followed throughout the Tri-County area (Wernick, 2006). As previously mentioned, Ron
Book helped to pass these laws within 60 cities and counties within Florida, and other
states after his children’s nanny sexually abused his daughter Lauren (Skipp & CampoFlores, 2009). Additionally, if a transient population cropped up within an allowable area,
politicians erected “pocket parks” to force them out of that area under SORRs (Rabin,
2014).
The collateral consequences of severe SORRs for RSOs, especially within urban
cities, is an increase in homelessness, lack of job opportunities or ability to hold a job
based on being homeless, broken family ties, and struggling financially to make ends
meet which promotes recidivism (Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government
Accountability [OPPAGA], 2018). Additionally, the areas deemed livable often do not
have affordable housing, are situated in industrial areas, or considered inhabitable places
such as under bridges, which result in homeless encampments. Arguably, the RSO will
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already be under strain from having to deal with the SORNA requirements, and with the
added pressure of not being able to find a home, desperation regarding their situation
might cause recidivism or the commission of new crimes (Kustura, 2015). Even Patty
Wetterling, Jacob Wetterling’s mother, worries about SORRs that create homelessness,
“If an offender ends up with no residence, that shouldn’t make any of us feel safer. What
they need is stability, support, counseling, and treatment” (Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009,
para. 15).
FLRR defines a transient offender address as a place where an offender lives for
more than three days within a calendar year and does not have a specific address (i.e.,
homeless and living in an abandoned lot). In 2018, OPPAGA reported that Broward and
Miami-Dade Counties have the second and third highest RSO rates with transient
addresses within Florida. The report maintains that both counties have double the State’s
average of offenders with transient addresses at 17.34 and 16.14 per 100,000 people. In
comparison, Palm Beach County, with a SORR that matches the FLRR, came in eleventh
place around the state average at 8.25 per 100,000 people (OPPAGA, 2018).
These laws promote homelessness, increased absconding, and strains law
enforcement to track and monitor transient RSOs. Furthermore, they undermine the
original intent and purpose of the registry, which is the ability for law enforcement and
the public to know where RSOs live (Levenson, 2018). Also, SORRs within major cities
and urban areas create clusters of homeless offenders by banishing them to small slivers
of land that they are allowed to inhabit (Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018). In a few
instances, these pieces of land might have access to running water, bathrooms and a roof,
like a trailer park or motel, but often, RSOs erect makeshift tents and sleep in cars in the
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small areas in which they are allowed until they are kicked out by law enforcement. If
RSOs can find housing within a neighborhood, multiple RSOs might live within one
house. Occasionally, caused by the scarcity of affordable housing within an area, a more
substantial portion of the county’s RSOs can live within one community, as was the case
in Broadview Park in Broward County (Broward Sex Offender & Sexual Predator
Residence Task Force Report [BTFR], 2009).
Notorious Clusters of RSOs in South Florida
Even though the laws, as mentioned earlier, are aimed to promote and foster
protection from RSOs for communities and neighborhoods, the collateral consequences
of these laws for RSOs can mean many RSOs become transient trying to stay within the
guidelines of these SORRs. In the case of stringent municipality SORRs, they leave little
land which RSOs can occupy, resulting in clusters in their makeshift communities. The
next section will examine a few well-known examples where these SORRs created
clusters within the Tri-County area over the past decade.
An infamous example of SORRs and the inability to find places to live within
Miami, Florida, is the Julia Tuttle Causeway Tent City. Hailing from lobbyist Ron
Book’s efforts to address molestation committed by his nanny on his eleven-year-old
daughter Lauren, Miami-Dade tightened residency laws in 2005, from 1,000 feet away
from schools, playgrounds, and parks to revise the boundary to include an additional
SORR of 2,500 feet from schools under Lauren’s Law. This severely impacted where
RSOs could live, and in some cases, eliminated entire cities within the county as possible
options (Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009). As a result, Tent City, sometimes called
“Bookville” after Ron Book’s lobbying efforts, became home to a cluster of RSOs,
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ranging from 80 to 140 RSOs at a given time (Lantigua, 2009; Levenson, 2018;
Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018).
From 2006 to 2010, under the Julia Tuttle Causeway (I-195), probation officers
would recommend the site or drop off newly released sex offenders. Traceable to severe
SORRs, makeshift shacks, and tents popped up under the bridge housing the RSOs who
found themselves without available, affordable housing options within the city (Rabin,
2014). After national exposure and embarrassment over shacks and tents crawling with
roaches and insects, reeking of human feces caused by a lack of running water or sewage
system, the City of Miami removed the RSOs and in conjunction with the Homeless
Trust, ironically with chairman Ron Book at the helm, attempted to provide temporary
housing for those RSOs (Hanks, 2016). Notably, the City of Miami installed parks near
the area, which would prohibit RSOs from returning to legally live within the area under
Lauren’s Law (Bene, 2009; Rabin, 2014; Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009).
After the national shaming regarding the Julia Tuttle Causeway Tent City, severe
SORRs still prohibited RSOs from living in most of the county. Between 2011 and 2012
and after being evicted from temporary housing or motels, some of the displaced RSOs,
from the Julia Tuttle Bridge encampment, started living on a lot on the corner of 10th
Avenue and Northeast 79th Street, in the Shorecrest neighborhood in Miami-Dade
County (The Huffington Post, 2012). After exhausting other living options, and some
declare under the advisement of parole officers, twenty or more RSOs lived on the
Shorecrest lot (Lilly, 2012). RSOs would sleep in cars, chairs, or tents overnight and
leave at dawn when the curfew is up (CBS Miami, 2012). To stop the influx of RSOs in
the neighborhood, Miami-Dade County Commissioner Marc Sarnoff constructed Little
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River Pocket Park, a small, underfunded, and unattractive park in Shorecrest (Rabin,
2014). Sarnoff proudly proclaims creating the park to keep sex offenders out of the
abandoned lot, “You can't be within a thousand feet of a park under state statute, so
[Department of Corrections] can no longer drop off any sexual offenders, predators, on
10th Avenue and 79th Street,” (Odzer & Hamacher, 2012, para. 5). While Sarnoff
admitted to the skimpy, existing playground equipment in Little River Pocket Park, he
cited a rush on the project for the lack of equipment (Lilly, 2012). To date, the park still
lacks designated parking, benches, and trash bins; also, the location of the park is in a
flood zone that floods several times a year (Goodman, 2018).
The Julia Tuttle encampment disbanded members went to other locations as well.
In 2010, up to 30 RSOs who previously lived under Julia Tuttle Bridge became homeless
again after being evicted from the Homestead Studio Suites in Miami-Dade County. The
corporate office did not want them on the premises after living there for just a few
months (Lebovich & Beasley, 2010).
In 2013, more than fifty RSOs were living in River Park, a trailer park in the
Allapattah neighborhood in Miami-Dade County. Some of them were initially displaced
from the Julia Tuttle Bridge encampment. Unbeknownst at the time, the Miami Bridge
Youth and Family Services, which services and houses troubled kids, is within 2,500 feet
of the trailer park and ergo, a prohibited space for RSOs to live (Rabin et al., 2013).
Coincidently, Homeless Trust Chairman Ron Book’s staff contacted the Department of
Corrections (DOC) to ensure that DOC updated their records and listed The Miami
Bridge Youth and Family Services as a gathering spot for children, and thus falling under
Lauren’s Law conditions of residency restrictions for RSOs (Rabin et al., 2013).
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Subsequently, law enforcement evicted RSOs out of the trailer park, with RSOs receiving
a maximum of five days' notice to pack up and find a new residence that complied with
the county’s SORRs (Puls, 2016; Rabin et al., 2013). Because of the restrictive SORRs,
most of the RSOs moved from the trailer park to the train tracks adjacent to a parking lot
and surrounding streets in Westgate, an industrial area (Rabin, 2014).
Since the eviction of RSOs from the Allapattah Trailer Park about mid-year 2013
to May 2018, over 250 RSOs called an industrial parking lot in the Westgate
neighborhood, near Hialeah, home, at least between the hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. every
night (Reutter, 2015). In the quest to find suitable and affordable housing for RSOs that
correspond to Lauren’s Law, the Westgate area in Hialeah is just another stop in the “Sex
Offender Shuffle,” as depicted by California artist Scott Gairdner (2009). The song
parodies the 1985 Chicago Bear’s “Super Bowl Shuffle” and makes a commentary on
Miami-Dade County’s frequent upheaval and removal of sex offenders from location to
location (Lipscomb, 2018b). Located on NW 71st Street and 36th Court in Miami-Dade
County, RSOs camped in a parking lot and surrounding streets situated in an industrial
area with no running water, bathroom, or electricity (McCoy, 2014). After local coverage
regarding this development and deeming the encampment as a public health and safety
hazard, Miami-Dade County notified the transient RSOs that they had forty-five days to
vacate the premises or be arrested by May 6, 2018 (Lipscomb, 2018a). However, the
ACLU and Legal Services of Greater Miami filed a lawsuit against Miami-Dade County
to dispute the constitutionality of the county ordinance regarding residency restrictions
and spoke against the overnight camping ordinances to no avail (Lipscomb, 2018b).
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While the lawsuit temporarily halted the eviction process of the RSOs from the area,
Miami-Dade County set a new date of eviction to June 11, 2018 (Lipscomb, 2018c).
Once again, the Homeless Trust and its chairperson, Ron Book, tried to help
RSOs find temporary housing. However, early reports claim that only one RSO from the
encampment had been placed (Hanks, 2018). Book claims that any RSO that asked for
help from the Homeless Trust received it, and those who say that the organization did not
help them with finding homes were “lying” (Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018, para. 38). In
an attempt to offer alternative locations to live, Miami-Dade County Police Department
(MDPD) sex crime unit located another campsite near Krome Avenue, by the Everglades,
as a possible relocation area (Hanks, 2018). Flyers of the new address in southwest
Miami-Dade County with a map were passed out throughout the RSOs in the Westgate
cluster. However, the same pervasive issue of no running water or bathrooms persists in
this new location (Hanks, 2018). Without an adjustment to the residency restrictions, the
ACLU and Legal Services claim that offenders will relocate to another corner, and the
cycle will keep repeating itself (Iannelli, 2018).
The aftermath of this situation is still playing out. The Westgate cluster attracted
global attention and became another stain on Miami-Dade County and the treatment of
RSOs and the stringent SORRs (Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018). The award-winning
multimedia story by The Marshall Project’s Schwartzapfel and Kassie’s documentary
Banished (2018) brought worldwide attention on the juxtaposition between homeless
RSOs, local politicians Deputy Mayor Maurice Kemp and Ron Book, the MDPD and
their views on RSOs issues and displacement (The Marshall Project, 2019).
Additionally, residents in the Kendall community, near the proposed relocation site of
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RSOs to Krome Avenue, already protested the move of RSOs near their families
(Rodriguez & Lopez, 2018).
The issues do not just exist in Miami-Dade County. Broward and Palm Beach
Counties also deal with the clustering of RSOs associated with broad-reaching SORRs. In
several of these instances, these clusters increased in size in the wake of the dismantling
of the Julia Tuttle Tent City as well as the release and reentry of RSOs into the area.
In 2009, in Broadview Park, a community that comprised less than 1% of the total
landmass of Broward County, housed about 100 RSOs, or almost 8% of the county’s total
RSOs (BTFR, 2009). Randy Young, an RSO and owner of Habitat for Sex Offenders,
helps RSOs to find housing within the SORRS. He discovered and leased several houses
in Broadview Park that abided by FLRR and did not have a municipal ordinance
regulating buffer zones (Aleksander, 2010). He then would sublease these houses to
RSOs. Some of the RSOs that live in Broadview Park were part of the original Julia
Tuttle Bridge cluster and were living in close quarters with as many as 24 people to one
house (Aleksander, 2010). The influx of RSOs from four RSOs in 2007 to over one
hundred in 2009 prompted outrage and a demand for change from the community.
Commissioner John Rodstrom proposed a temporary SORR mandating a 2,500-foot
buffer zone of schools, parks, daycares, and school bus stops before the Broward County
Commission (Wyman, 2009). The Commission passed an emergency ordinance to
increase the buffer zones to prevent other RSOs from moving into the neighborhood
(Aleksander, 2010; Wyman, 2009). While this prohibited new RSOs from moving into
the area, those existing could continue to live in the community.

23

Additionally, in 2011, at the Fort Lauderdale Budget Inn located in Broward
County, the Sun-Sentinel called the owner of Budget Inn for a comment regarding the 24
RSOs staying at the hotel. The owner, Glen Patel, did not realize that RSOs resided there
and initiated the evection process of the RSOs (Hendley, 2011). Patel cited the safety of
his other guests as the reason for the eviction. Even, probation officers tried to reason
with him because having the RSOs live there allows for easier monitoring of the RSOs
within a commercial district, away from neighborhoods containing families (Santana &
Williams, 2011). Some RSOs had been living there for about a year, with the records
indicating that an additional 36 RSOs called this Budget Inn home between 2007 and
2011 (Santana & Williams, 2011).
Conversely, in Palm Beach County, some RSO communities are emerging in the
wake of the housing need for RSOs. Established in 2009, Matthew 25 Ministries (M25M)
own several houses within Miracle Village located in Pahokee, Florida, in Palm Beach
County (Matthew 25 Ministries [M25M], 2015). With over 150 RSOs in the community,
some of the residents previously lived in the Julia Tuttle Causeway cluster (M25M, 2015;
Schindler, 2018; Worford, 2013). M25M helps to provide low cost, shared rooms, reentry
classes, and counseling for RSOs (M25M, 2015). Miracle Village boasts success, arguing
that RSOs need support and the proper tools to reenter society successfully (M25M,
2015). In early 2019, Matthew 25 Ministries formed a new company, Restoration
Destination, charged with the sole purpose of running this reentry program (Witherow,
2019).
Weekly, the ministry receives between ten to twenty applications (Pressly, 2013).
M25M rejects applications of RSOs who have a history of drug abuse or violence, as well
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as those with diagnosed pedophilia, which are sex offenders only aroused by
prepubescent children (Pressly, 2013). Additionally, applicants must take responsibility
for the crimes they committed (Schindler, 2018). Many residents in the program attend
treatment programs, church, have jobs in town, and continue to rebuild their lives,
sometimes even dating (Pressly, 2013; Wolford, 2013). In the village, there is a 7 p.m.
curfew for RSOs. Many RSOs wear GPS ankle bracelets, are subject to random drug
tests, and some cannot use the internet or own a smartphone (Sandburn, 2014). While
Restoration Destination starts a newly released RSO off with a furnished apartment and
other items to get started, residents pay the monthly rent of $550, which includes utilities
(Kornfield, 2019).
Initially, residents of the small city of Pahokee were not so understanding or
accepting of a neighborhood filled with sex offenders. Turning this portion of the city
into residential housing for sex offenders provoked fear and outrage from the mayor,
calling it “risky” to community members. The belief was that no one from outside of the
city cared if all the RSOs ended up in their small, removed town (Wolford, 2013).
Surprisingly, some members of the community try to accept RSOs into various activities,
including an all-adult church service at the First United Methodist Church, where clearly
defined rules are established ahead of time with a zero-tolerance policy (Wolford, 2013).
This alternative community of RSOs attracted international attention through a
photojournalist article in the South German Times (Christie, 2014), and then again with a
book by Sofia Valiente showcasing twelve residents of Miracle Village (Valiente, 2014).
Most recently, in 2018, a BBC documentary premiered with Stacey Dooley on a visit to
Miracle Village (Chan & Lankston, 2018). While this housing arrangement might be
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more attractive concerning living conditions for RSOs, these villages may promote an
alternative subculture due to the ostracization from the surrounding community and,
ultimately, increase recidivism.
Residency Restrictions and Recidivism
Prevention of recidivism through community awareness, monitoring by law
enforcement, and the registry acting as a deterrent and shame factor are primary goals for
compiling a public registry and creating SORRs. The expected outcome of Sex Offender
Registration and Notification (SORN) laws and SORRs should be to decrease the
opportunity for RSOs to have contact with minors and, ultimately, reduce recidivism.
However, complex issues arise when discussing recidivism among RSOs. While studies
show that recidivism for RSOs is low (Langan et al., 2003; Sample & Bray, 2003), others
allude to the dark figure of crime or not counting parole violations within recidivism
numbers hindering an accurate count regarding recidivism (Przybylski, 2015).
One of the most extensive studies of sex offender recidivism was completed by
Langan and colleagues (2003). In that work, male sex offenders were compared across
15 states to male non-sex offenders released from prison in 1994. Results showed only
3.5% of sex offenders recidivated within three years of being released. Moreover, when
looking at the rearrest rates of sex offenders and non-sex offenders, sex offenders
possessed an overall lower rearrest rate by 25% over the three year study period (Langan
et al., 2003). Another large study by Sample and Bray (2003) also determined that the
overall recidivism rate of sex offenders was lower than most other categories of
offenders. Under-reporting of sex offenses to law enforcement may be impacting
recidivism rates. On the other hand, the RSO might have committed a nonsexual crime,
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such as parole violation, as discussed above (Przybylski, 2015). Both scenarios can
obscure accurate sex offense recidivism estimates.
The next section explores the possible factors that can trigger recidivism.
Levinson & Cotter (2005b), in a qualitative study of RSOs in Florida, ascertained that
residency restrictions hurt RSOs, including, but not limited to, decreased stability and
possibly triggering re-offenses. Hanson, Harris, Helmus, and Thorton (2014) maintain
that sexual recidivism among RSOs can vary based on the severity of the risk to re-offend
determined by the Violence Risk Scale – Sexual Offender Version (VRS-SO).
Additionally, they claim recidivism may also vary depending on whether RSOs receive
treatment and support, and the time they were able to remain offense-free within society,
similar to aging out of crime process. In previous studies, Mustaine, Tewksbury, and
Stengel (2006, 2008) determined that in five different counties (Duval, Seminole,
Jefferson, Fayette, and Cook) in over three different states (Florida, Kentucky, and
Illinois), RSOs lived in more socially disorganized areas than what is present within the
state as well as the country.
Furthermore, Socia (2016) analyzed 53 census tracts in Upstate New York and
found that RSOs disproportionally live in socially disorganized and disadvantaged
neighborhoods. Furthermore, there are additional studies regarding the areas in which
RSOs live. Zgoba, Levenson, & McKee (2009) analyzed housing availability after
considering residency restrictions in Camden County, New Jersey, to determine that few
options for housing exist for RSOs outside of the exclusionary zones guided by local and
state law.
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Other studies surrounding recidivism and clustering of ex-offenders propose that
it is a combination of individual characteristics of an ex-offender, as well as
neighborhood characteristics, including social disorganization, that determine the
likelihood of recidivism (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015). D. S. Kirk (2015) argues that
having a neighborhood with a concentration of ex-offenders leads to significantly higher
rates of recidivism. Social ties, parole policies, as well as limited housing opportunities,
contribute to stressors that keep ex-offenders in their old neighborhood (Chamberlain &
Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2015). By placing ex-offenders with other ex-offenders in a
concentrated area, it is reasonable to question whether the criminal behavior of a group
affects an individual's criminal conduct in the neighborhood. By applying this rationale,
the question then becomes, would there be a lower recidivism rate if RSOs could live
dispersed throughout the counties versus being clustered ascribable to residency
restrictions? This research seeks to examine this issue.
To date, only one study looked at the spatial clustering of RSOs and recidivism
rates within neighborhoods. Socia (2013) examined RSO recidivism rates in 52 counties
in Upstate New York and found that there was a nominal positive relationship with rates
of recidivistic sex crimes against adult victims. However, the author acknowledges that
because the study was only over twelve months, this limited the number of variables for
the study. The current research seeks to overcome this situation by analyzing RSO
clusters, measure social disorganization and deviant subculture, and recidivism of RSOs
within these clusters for a three-year timeframe, instead of twelve months.
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Significance of the Study
Florida, in particular, South Florida, is a hotbed of discussion surrounding sex
offenders. From high profile cases which lead to a change in laws, like Jessica Lunsford
and Lauren Book, to the ramification of those laws such as RSOs sleeping under bridges
and on the side of the street in industrialized areas, laws in South Florida governing RSOs
developed into a national story and a center of controversy. Questions and narratives
surrounding RSOs such as whether it matters where RSOs live and how close is too close
continue to drive the conversation of SORRs within Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm
Beach Counties in South Florida. Paired with concerns about transient RSOs sleeping on
a corner in a community to not-in-my-backyard ordinances, local law enforcement, and
politicians find themselves caught in between enforcing the law and understanding that
everyone needs a place to sleep. While academic research shows severe SORRs facilitate
situations that possibly enhance recidivism, promote homelessness, cause difficulty for
law enforcement to track transient offenders, and a host of other unintended
consequences, the laws still stand.
The current investigation is significant as the research surrounding clustering for
RSOs can provide crucial information regarding the policy. Even though there are several
studies regarding social disorganization and registered sexual offenders, there remains a
gap in the research regarding the combination of RSOs, socially disorganized areas,
clustering RSOs, subculture theory of urbanism, and the effect on recidivism rates. This
study proposes that the totality of residency restrictions, the socially disorganized areas in
which RSOs live, the clustering of RSOs, and the subculture theory of urbanism will
provide a more comprehensive look at the reasons behind recidivism. This more holistic
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approach moves beyond just analyzing the area and the lack of support and facilities that
contribute to an individual's success or recidivism by examining the scope of the
environmental and ecological factors such as the positive reinforcement of subcultures
within clusters of like-minded RSOs that are key in determining rehabilitation or
recidivism. From the perspective of social disorganization theory, monitoring RSO
clustering shows the areas in which treatment facilities, public transportation, and other
social services should be located to reduce the likelihood of recidivism. From a
subcultural theory of urbanism perspective, analyzing residency restrictions would help
determine if these restrictions are contributing to recidivism rates by creating clusters of
deviant subcultures and are therefore ineffective and paradoxically criminogenic.
Research Questions & Hypotheses
1. Are RSOs within Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties in Florida violating
the law by living within 1,000 feet of a school, childcare facility, park, or playground,
according to Florida State Statute 775.215?
Hypothesis 1: As a consequence of the concentration of schools, childcare facilities,
parks, and playgrounds and the extent of the buffer zone around these areas, RSOs are
not 100% compliant to Florida State Statute.
2. Within Miami-Dade, Broward, & Palm Beach Counties in Florida, do clusters of RSOs
fall within socially disorganized areas?
Hypothesis 2: Past clusters would indicate that groups of RSOs in compliance with the
statute would be located near industrial areas, trailer home parks, motels, and other
socially disorganized areas. RSO clusters that might violate the statute could be located
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near a new development of a school, childcare facility, park, or playground and have not
had a chance to relocate.
3. Subsequent to these residency requirements, are there unforeseen and unintended
consequences for the community at large when RSOs are clustered within a census tract
in the form of an increased rate of recidivism?
Hypothesis 3: There is a direct correlation between recidivism and clustering since the
residency restrictions push RSOs to live in limited, socially disorganized areas with RSO
deviant subcultures, which are detrimental to their successful reentry progress. A higher
rate of recidivism of RSOs will occur where RSOs live closer together in clusters.
Theoretical Framework
In explaining the steadfast and increasing sexual offender management policies,
the moral panic theory describes the law-making process. Cohen (1972/2002) and Goode
and Ben-Yehuda (1994/2009) discuss moral panics as the public’s reaction to an event or
perceived notions concerning the behavior of a fringe group. Media coverage follows the
public’s opinion, and law enforcement or those in power seek to address the concerns
which can lead to a change in policy (Cohen, 1972/2002; Goode & Ben-Yehuda,
1994/2009). When heinous crimes like those committed against Jacob Wetterling, Megan
Kanaka, Jimmy Rice, and Jessica Lunsford severely impact a community and the media
extensively covers the incident, creating and reinforcing the idea of a monster who
perpetrated these acts on an innocent victim, panic persists. As a result of this socially
constructed monster, the media forms a divided us-versus-them mentality and calls upon
policymakers to change existing laws or create new ones to prohibit similar events from
happening. Ultimately, this leads to stricter criminal laws, prompted from an emotional,
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knee-jerk reaction to memorialize a victim, even if the new policy might not be practical
(Critcher, 2006; Surette, 2007).
Furthermore, as new victims fall prey to these seemingly similar sex offenders,
again, panic ensues, media heightens and propagates fear through continued coverage,
and policymakers construct new laws with increased punishments. The panic from the
first event does not have a chance to dissipate before the next incident happens. With
each event, the cycle of public outcry, the social construction of the incident, and the
offender and the reaction of lawmakers heightens, producing a perpetual state of panic
(Burchfield et al., 2017).
When policymakers make a snap decision, utilizing old habits and old policies, or
base policy on personal interests or values, unintended consequences occur (Merton,
1936). Severe SORRs can generate clusters of RSOs within socially disorganized areas
(Colorado Department of Public Safety [CDPS], 2004; Socia & Stamatel, 2012).
Additionally, expanding SORRs can almost banish RSOs from cities altogether, causing
RSOs to fail to register, abscond, or fail to update their address on file with law
enforcement (Chajewski & Mercado, 2009; Zandbergen & Hart, 2009; Zgoba et al.,
2009). These outcomes defeat the purposes of sex offender management policies meant
to track RSOs and foster public awareness of RSOs whereabouts. To compound the
situation, SORRs cluster RSOs within socially disorganized areas that do not possess the
level of informal controls that an affluent community does (Bursik, 1988). Furthermore,
socially disorganized areas lack the support that RSOs need to form prosocial
relationships, become gainfully employed, and access treatment facilities (Lee-Silcox,
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2016, Mustaine & Tewksbury, 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006, Rolfe, Tweksbury, &
Schroeder, 2017).
Correspondingly, while socially disorganized areas deter prosocial relationships
(Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006), clusters of ex-offenders within
these areas encourage criminal activity and distrust of law enforcement (D. S. Kirk,
2015). With stressors of finding housing, becoming employed, facing shame and ridicule
for themselves and their family, ex-offenders might bond with those in a similar situation
(Holt et al., 2010). Moreover, clustering ex-offenders within an area exacerbates the
availability of bonding with like-minded criminals, which can reinforce subculture
behaviors (Gomes, 2017b; D. S. Kirk, 2015). Clustering leads to increased opportunities
for criminal activity as well as reinforce criminally deviant behavior and a disregard for
law enforcement, which can lead to recidivism (D. S. Kirk, 2015). The combination of
clustering RSOs in socially disorganized areas, the feeling of shame and embarrassment
from SORN, and dealing with reentry barriers results in the increased likelihood of
recidivism by RSOs.
Overview of Methodology
Study 1: Measure RSOs in conjunction with FLRR within Miami-Dade, Broward,
and Palm Beach Counties
Study 1 consists of looking where RSOs within the study live in relation to the
critical elements within FLRR: schools, childcare facilities, parks, and playgrounds.
Secondly, it determines if any of the RSOs’ home addresses violate FLRR and identifies
these areas. In order to look at these critical factors, Geographic Information Systems
(GIS) will be utilized in the form of ArcGIS Pro by Esri to visually map out the
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residences of the RSOs, as well as the locations of schools, childcare facilities, parks, and
playgrounds with a buffer of 1,000 feet to determine the boundaries according to FLRR.
From this visualization, violators of FLRR will be identified as it pertains to the
residency requirements set forth.
Study 2: Clusters of RSOs within socially disorganized areas
Study 2 explores the clusters of RSOs found within Study 1 and determines if the
areas fall within the category of socially disorganized areas. Study 2 contributes to the
discussion of reentry and recidivism of RSOs. Previous studies established that
recidivism is more likely if former prisoners live within socially disorganized areas as
there is a limitation of services, such as transportation, employment opportunities,
treatment centers, and proximity to family members that would help the reentry process
and decrease the likelihood of recidivism (Barnes et al., 2009; Casady, 2009; Levenson &
Cotter, 2005b; Levenson & Hern, 2007; MNDOC, 2003; Socia, 2012a). This study
replicates and extends this idea because the examination is within several major
metropolitans, high population density areas.
Study 3: The unintended consequences of residency restrictions: Looking at the
subculture of urbanism, communities of RSOs, and recidivism risk
Study 3 seeks to determine if one of the unintended consequences of residency
restrictions of RSOs is increased recidivism linked to the subculture created within
clusters. Since residency restrictions of RSOs were put into place to curb and eliminate
potential targets, i.e., children, studying the recidivism rates of RSOs that live within
these confines is of great importance to understanding if this policy is effective or
counterproductive. By measuring the inverse distance between RSOs and several
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neighboring RSOs, the unintended impact of the residency restrictions, mainly if the
RSOs are clustered within communities, on recidivism will be measured.
Delimitations of the Study
The Tri-County area encompassing Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach
Counties in Florida selected for examination in the present study. Intensive, globally
publicized clusters of transient RSOs coupled with excessive SORRs within urban areas,
led the researcher to choose these areas in Florida. These three counties reflect similar
population characteristics, including some of the state’s highest rates of RSOs and
transient RSOs, which also guided their selection while limiting the inclusion of other
counties and states in the study.
The time constraints of a three-year snapshot of recidivism were because FDLE
does not keep historical listings of the sex offender registry. While this is also a
limitation, the researcher chose to move forward with the study as it could still address a
gap in the literature discussing the clustering of RSOs and rates of recidivism.
Additionally, since a limited period exists within the study, the researcher elected
rearrests as the measurement for recidivism.
Chapter Summary
The topic of sex offenders, where they reside in geographical proximity to childcentric locations, and laws governing residency restrictions, sparks controversy,
emotional arguments, and an us-versus-them stance. While the state of Florida
implemented a residency restriction on sex offenders of 1,000 feet from schools, parks,
playgrounds, or childcare facilities, municipalities expanded these areas by passing
auxiliary ordinances. As a result of these SORRs, the Tri-County area of Miami-Dade,
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Broward, and Palm Beach faced global scrutiny for practically banishing RSOs to live
under bridges, in empty lots, and within the largest designated sex offender colony in the
world in Pahokee, Florida.
As time passed, panic grew with a few highly-publicized cases of children being
kidnapped, raped, and killed by sex offenders. This moral panic erupted in public outcry,
extensive media coverage, a call to action from the victim’s family and community, and
politicians responding by passing memorial laws designed to honor the victim’s memory
and prevent these types of incidents from reoccurring. However, amid emotional
arguments and intense pressure to be tough on crime, the laws passed often resulted in
unintended consequences such as undermining the protection that the new policies were
to afford. As the requirements become increasingly more restrictive, the blowback
intensifies.
The backlash of increased SORRs caused transient RSO clusters throughout
South Florida. The constant displacement and banishment to areas that do not have any
running water or shelter from the elements intensify the stressors to RSOs trying to abide
by the municipality’s SORRs. Additionally, the clusters created by the SORRs show
signs of RSOs bonding over shared experiences and hardships. These relationships,
coupled with living in socially disorganized areas lacking in informal and formal
controls, may ultimately lead to increased criminal activity and recidivism. However,
more research is needed to determine whether these associations hold up to further
scrutiny when evaluated over an extended period. Hence, this study seeks to fill a gap in
the existing literature by determining if RSOs are living in clusters within socially
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disorganized areas and analyzing if the spatial proximity of RSO clusters impacts the rate
of recidivism within metropolitan areas with severe SORRs.
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II.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Mass Incarceration

In the 1960s, President Lyndon B. Johnson pronounced a “war on crime” and
dubbed the urban policeman as a “frontline soldier” within this mission, essentially
militarizing local law enforcement (Hinton, 2015). In the 1980s, fear and panic over
ballooning violence, crack cocaine, the death of basketball star Len Bias, and the war on
drugs prompted mandatory minimum prison sentences (Zimring, 2005). In the mid1990s, the highly publicized murders of teenagers Polly Klaas and Kimber Reynolds by
repeat offenders who were out on parole prompted three-strikes laws on state and federal
levels (Vitiello, 1997). These “get tough on crime” laws over the past 50 years stem from
tragic, widely publicized events, which ultimately contributed to mass incarceration
(Mallicoat & Gardiner, 2014).
The fallout from these sentencing reforms and laws impacted not only the
offender, but they also affected their family, neighborhood, and as noted, resulted in a
ballooning mass incarceration problem in the United States (Currie, 1998/2013; Mallicoat
& Gardiner, 2014; Mears & Cochran, 2015). Since the institution of these laws, the
United States is now the number one incarcerator in the world, with an average of 698
people out of every 100,000 people behind bars (Wagner & Sawyer, 2018). This number
constitutes over two million people annually. The consequence of mass incarceration is
the inability of states to provide safe, constitutional, government-run facilities, and the
ability to keep up with the rate of incarceration of offenders, even though the crime rate
has decreased over the past thirty years (Mears & Cochran, 2015).
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With these high rates of incarceration, funding and budgeting shifted on a national
level from education to imprisonment. However, what happens to these prisoners once
they have served their time and released? National-level estimates indicate that, on
average, 67% of those who have been released end up behind bars again within three
years, and approximately 75% end up in the prison system within five years (James,
2015). The overwhelming majority recidivate, either committing new crimes or violating
a condition of their probation.
Reentry
Once an offender is released, barriers to a successful reentry remain present.
Sizeable obstacles to successful reentry exist for ex-offenders, including, but not limited
to, a lack of housing, employment, stressed family circumstances, lack of resources for
treatment, law enforcement supervision, and disenfranchisement (Figure 1).
Disenfranchisement refers to the elimination of the right to vote, limited or restricted
access to student loans, loss of parental rights, inability to serve on a jury, denial of
government welfare, and the suspension of other civil liberties (Mears & Cochran, 2015).
When ex-offenders leave prison, housing issues also arise. Some newly released
inmates might not have family willing to take them into their house or unable on account
of welfare restrictions, and others do not have enough money to provide themselves
adequate housing (La Vigne et al., 2006; Mears & Cochran, 2015).
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Figure 1
Barriers to Reentry
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RSOs face the barriers mentioned above and more. In addition to possibly having
strained relationships with family and friends, their houses are typically off-limits to
RSOs due to the extreme SORRs in South Florida. Severe SORRs result in the inability
to stay with family members and others who could have assisted with offender
reintegration. Being effectively banned from living with relatives is not experienced by
other ex-convicts that are re-entering society as they can stay with their family and
friends. Additionally, studies show that RSOs who live with and maintain support from
family and friends have a significantly lower number of violations than RSOs without
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help, even if they live with friends and family (CDPS, 2004). Furthermore, finding a
residence that conforms to enhanced SORRs in the Tri-County area can be challenging
since many communities enacted 2,500 feet restrictions from any school, daycare, park,
and bus stops. Thus, there is a substantial difficulty for an RSO to find a residence
outside of a restricted zone with affordable rent and a landlord willing to rent to them
(Levenson & Cotter, 2005b; OPPAGA, 2018).
Once an RSO finds housing, a street corner, or encampment to live, that address is
publicly available for anyone to obtain (FDLE, 2018b). Additional information on each
RSO, such as a picture, name, birth date, physical description, address, car description
and tag number, and charges, are also publicly available on FDLE’s website (FDLE,
2018b). As a result of this public exposure on the registry website, RSOs experience
regular harassment such as garbage and bottles being thrown at them (Levenson &
Cotter, 2005; Reischel, 2006; Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009).
Obtaining a job can be a challenge for ex-offenders because of multiple factors
like lack of stability of housing, not having reliable transportation or a license, and low
educational attainment (Mears & Cochran, 2015; Zgoba et al., 2009). Additionally, most
job applications contain a question or a checkbox asking whether the applicant was
previously convicted of a crime. As an ex-felon, an RSO faces the possibility of
discrimination by checking this box and the possibility of not being hired (Zgoba et al.,
2009). While studies show that this practice often disenfranchises ex-offenders,
eliminating or “banning the box” can show a decrease in discrimination based on
previous convictions, increase the employability of those reentering society, and owning
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to the stabilizing qualities of employment result in an overall reduction in crime
(D'Alessio, Stolzenberg, & Flexon, 2014).
Also, those who are released often have a significant need for either drug
treatment or mental health treatment and services. Lack of monitoring and treatment for
such persistent issues also cause a higher rate of recidivism (CDPS, 2004; Kubrin &
Stewart, 2006; Mears & Cochran, 2015). As previously discussed, ex-offenders
experience denial of welfare benefits leaving housing or food stamps out of reach (Mears
& Cochran, 2015). The added layer of supervision by law enforcement, while being
utilized to ensure that ex-prisoners are on the straight and narrow, might constitute a
hindrance versus help because of the “Big Brother” feeling ex-offenders may perceive
after already serving their time (Mears & Cochran, 2015).
Notably, severe SORRs cause most, if not all, RSOs to live in socially
disorganized areas where support systems often do not exist (CDPS, 2004). Equally of
concern, these neighborhoods do not contain the treatment facilities or work opportunities
for RSOs, which increases the amount of travel time and distance and present yet another
barrier to successful reentry (CDPS, 2004; Hipp, Petersilia, & Turner, 2010; MNDOC,
2003). Additionally, these neighborhoods limit access to transportation, pro-social
relationships, employment opportunities, and treatment centers (D. S. Kirk, 2015;
Mustaine & Tewksbury, 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006, Rolfe et al., 2017). If ex-offenders
moved into a socially disorganized neighborhood, the lack of informal controls within a
socially disorganized neighborhood prevents the effective policing of further criminal
activity by the members of the community and exposes residents to possible victimization
(Socia & Stamatel, 2012).
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Broken relationships with family and friends, lack of housing, few employment
prospects following SORRs, being listed on the public registry, and other stressors impact
RSOs (Levenson, 2018; Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Mercado et al., 2008; Monjeau, 2011;
Mulford et al., 2009; Tewksbury & Lees, 2006) and their families (Farkas & Miller,
2007; Levenson & Tewksbury, 2009). Consequently, the stressors that RSOs face on a
consistent and daily basis can lead to recidivism (Tewskbury & Lees, 2006; Tewksbury
& Mustaine 2009). Studies warn that these collateral consequences from severe SORRs
and public registries not only contribute to recidivism, they also can influence RSOs
failing to register (Levenson et al., 2010) and absconding, (Levenson et al., 2013) which
entirely defeats the purpose behind SORN and SORR laws. Notably, the Colorado
Department of Public Safety (CDPS) (2004) discerned that RSOs who maintained
support and prosocial relationships, employment, and housing violated parole less versus
RSOs who lacked these resources.
Recidivism
Above the national average, Florida averages 883 out of every 100,000 people
incarcerated within the state system (Wagner & Sawyer, 2018). However, Florida’s
recidivism rate is lower than the national average (Gelb & Velazquez, 2018). Annually,
the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) releases recidivism reports discussing the
different cohorts by year and the recidivism rates (defined as reincarceration) and rearrest
rates (for any crime). The three-year recidivism rates from each of the cohorts released in
2009 to 2015 range between 24.5% and 26.3% over the years for the State, decreasing
yearly (FDOC, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). Hence, over 25,000 prisoners per year would
return to Florida’s jails and prisons within three years of their release. At $18,000 per
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year per prisoner, this amount quickly accrues, and the state often finds itself struggling
to shift dollars from prisons to other areas of the budget where the money is needed, like
education (Florida Department of Corrections [FDOC], 2014). Moreover, as time passes,
each cohort’s recidivism rate steadily increases, but the overall recidivism rates for each
cohort decrease (e.g., 2009 cohort’s recidivism rate increased from 26.3% at three years
to 35.5% at five years, while 2010’s cohort’s recidivism rate at three years was 25.7%).
Decreasing by year, five-year recidivism rates (based on incarceration) from cohorts
released in 2009 to 2013 range between a total of 34.2% to 35.3% of former prisoners
returned to incarceration within the state of Florida (FDOC, 2019). While the rate of
rearrests has been declining over the years, the figures are still significant, with the threeyear rearrest rates from 2009 to 2015 cohorts ranging between 60.2% to 65.2% and
decreasing over time (FDOC, 2018, 2019).
Sex Offender Management Policies
Despite the public’s misconception that recidivism rates regarding sexual
offenders are high and historically elevated, (Sample & Bray, 2003; Tewksbury &
Jennings, 2010), recidivism rates regarding sexual offenses consistently maintain at low
levels (Bench & Allen, 2013; Harris & Hanson, 2004; Howard, 2011; Langan et al.,
2003) even before sex offender management policies were put into effect (Levenson &
Zgoba, 2016). Hanson and Bussire (1998) performed a meta-analysis of over 60 studies
of sex offender recidivism totaling 28,972 offenders. The study, which looked at
recidivism rates after a 4 to 5 year period, found sexual offenses accounted for 13.4% and
depended on rates of sexual deviance and other criminological factors like prior arrests
age, etc. (Hanson & Bussiere, 1998).
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Another study examined a sample of 4,724 sexual offenders across three countries
(United States, United Kingdom, and Canada), and measured sexual recidivism at 5, 10,
and 15 years, without controlling for risk (Harris & Hanson, 2004). In that study, Harris
and Hanson (2004) discovered that recidivism declined over time as the offender was out
of jail, ranging from 14% at initial release to less than 4% after fifteen years. This finding
becomes particularly noteworthy since recidivism, among other crimes, tends to increase
over time.
When compared to other criminal types, sex offenders recidivate at lower levels
(Langan et al., 2003; Sample & Bray, 2003, 2006). Written in 2003, Langan et al.
authored one of the most comprehensive studies regarding recidivism and sexual
offenders as compared to other crime types and offenders. Spanning information from
fifteen states and tracking 9,691 sex offenders from their release from 1994 to 1997, the
study measured the rearrest, reconviction, and reimprisonment rates of sex offenders and
compared them to non-sex offenders. The findings indicated that rearrest and
reconviction rates were lower than those of non-sex offenders (Langan et al., 2003).
Similarly, in their studies, Sample and Bray (2003, 2006) found that during the
five years after release, less than 7% of sex offenders recidivated for sex offenses while
property offenders exhibited the highest rate of recidivism at almost 39%. Additionally,
sex offenders showed a lower rate of general recidivism across the board in comparison
with other offenders (Sample & Bray, 2003, 2006). Studies also show that the majority of
sex offenders will either not spend any time in jail or prison, spend minimal time
incarcerated, and eventually be released back into the community (CDPS, 2004; La
Vigne et al., 2006a).
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While the rates of recidivism differ for sex crimes than other crimes, management
policies might not influence recidivism. Levenson and Zgoba (2016) looked at the
average yearly repeat arrests in Florida by crime type from 1990 to 2010, with the
intervention year of 1997, when sex offender management policies including public
registry, civil commitment, SORRs, mandatory minimum sentencing, and electronic
monitoring began. They showed that sex offense rearrests rate by year pre- and post-sex
offender management policies were consistently lower than other violent crime types
(Levenson & Zgoba, 2016). Nevertheless, the rate of rearrest for sex offenders show a
moderate but significant increase after the intervention year when sex offender
management policies launched. Simultaneously, other crimes’ rearrest rates increased as
well after the intervention year. Nonetheless, the authors cannot confirm that these sex
offender management policies prevented sexual re-offense.
Sex Offender Residency Restrictions
SORRs can severely limit where RSOs can live and impact recidivism. Zgoba et
al. (2009) determined that of 211 registered tier 2 and tier 3 offenders and non-offenders
in Camden County, New Jersey, there is not a significant difference between where RSOs
and non-offenders live concerning proximity to schools and daycares when looking at
buffer zones of 1,000 feet and 2,500 feet. Instead, housing choices seem to be in line with
practicality to the location of housing, as 80% of residences are also within 2,500 feet of
schools and daycares (Zgoba et al., 2009). Ergo, housing for RSOs would be minimal if a
2,500-foot law would be enacted (Zgoba et al., 2009). Instead, a 2,500-foot SORR would
hinder successful reentry to the community and possibly increase the likelihood of
recidivism. As the development of housing complexes in an area increases, communities
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also expand the number of schools and daycares into a part of the process of growing
neighborhoods. In turn, existing SORRs become relevant to that area as well.
Furthermore, other studies show SORRs are ineffective as a deterrent (Blood et
al., 2008; CDPS, 2004; MNDOC, 2003; Nobles et al., 2012; Socia, 2012b, 2015;
Tewksbury & Jennings, 2010). With the understanding that the goals of SORRs are to
prevent abuse, protect children, and reduce overall offending, the Division of Criminal
Justice and Juvenile Planning in Iowa compared the number of charges twelve months
prior the implementation SORR of 2,000 feet and the two years following the
implementation (Blood et al., 2008). In fact, Blood and colleagues (2008) found that the
number of charges for sex offenses against minors increased year after year, leading to
the conclusion that implementation of the 2,000 feet buffer did not decrease potential
child victims. Correspondingly, on an aggregate level (Socia, 2015), state-level (CDPS,
2004; MNDOC, 2003; Socia, 2012b), and whether looking at recidivistic or first-time sex
offenders (Nobles et al., 2012), these studies concurred that SORRs does not act as a
deterrent and should not be a method for controlling recidivism by sex offenders.
Further evidence suggests that larger buffer zones for SORRs are not a deterrent.
A study by Zandbergen, Levenson, and Hart (2010) looked at recidivistic arrests in the
state of Florida over two years to determine if living within 1,000, 1,500, and 2,500 feet
of schools or daycares predicted a reoccurring event. This study also sampled nonrecidivistic RSOs who previously victimized a minor and committed a similar number of
crimes as the recidivistic sample. Overall, this study compared a high-risk group to
another high-risk group versus a random sample (Zandbergen et al., 2010). Zandbergen
and colleagues (2010) found that it did not matter if RSOs lived closer to schools and
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daycares (1,000 feet away) or if they lived farther away (1,500 feet or more). Distance
did not affect reoffending rates.
Similarly, another study done in Jacksonville, Florida, determined that the
increase over the state SORRs from 1,000 to 2,500 feet did not have a significant effect
on sexual recidivism or sex crime arrests (Nobles et al., 2012). Furthermore, Stucky and
Ottensmann (2016) showed that the number of RSOs living within a section of the city
with buffers of 1,000, 1,500, and 2,500 feet did not determine the number of sex offense
incidents. Instead, they deduced that above average violent crime counts in areas are
more determinant of sex offense incidents (Stucky & Ottensmann, 2016).
SORRs and Housing
The least restricted areas often possessed the lowest available, affordable
housing; hence, rural areas might remain the areas where RSOs could live (Socia, 2011).
Chadjewski and Mercado’s (2009) study of New Jersey counties and SORRs in rural and
urban regions observed that within urban areas, the more stringent the restricted zones
are, the increased likelihood RSOs were banished from living within particular counties.
For example, under a 1,000 feet restriction in urban areas corresponded to almost 65% of
RSOs being restricted from living within that area; at 2,500 feet within an urban or rural
setting, nearly all RSOs (100% rural and > 98% urban) could not live in the area
(Chajewski & Mercado, 2009).
In urban settings with high population density areas and more restrictive SORRs,
calling for greater distances from schools, daycares, and parks, housing for RSOs appears
to be even more challenging. In particular, a study of housing availability in Miami-Dade
County, Florida concerning the 2,500 feet county SORR revealed only 43 possible units
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in the entire county that were available to rent in July 2009 (where the rent was $1250 or
less per month) out of the 424,136 residential units in Miami-Dade in the same price
range (Zandbergen & Hart, 2009). However, while the results show 43 possible units
available for rent for $1,250 or less, the question remains if the landlord would rent the
unit to an ex-felon, particularly to an RSO.
RSOs and Socially Disorganized Neighborhoods
RSOs, like other ex-offenders, move into socially disorganized areas upon release
(Clark & Duwe, 2015; Hughs & Burchfield, 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006). Hughes and
Burchfield’s (2008) study discovered that roughly 50% of the RSOs resided in a
restricted area, with most living in a socially disorganized neighborhood. Socia and
Stamatel (2012) found RSO residences cluster in socially disorganized areas, particularly
in specific areas with higher levels of concentrated disadvantage, residential instability,
ethnic heterogeneity, and in areas with less informal control mechanisms.
While the main focus of SORN laws consists of making information readily
available to the public to help them police their neighborhoods, within socially
disorganized areas, these extra layers of social controls are lacking (Mustaine &
Tewksbury, 2008; Socia & Stamatel, 2012). Within these neighborhoods, the underuse
of public registries might occur as a result of a lack of access by inhabitants of the area.
As described previously, socially disorganized areas lack the ability to possess informal
control and less collective efficacy, which, in turn, increases anonymity (Socia &
Stamatel, 2012). Hence, SORRs relegate RSOs to these communities, which allow them
to blend in among residents (Socia & Stamatel, 2012; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008).
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Clustering of RSOs and Recidivism.
Moreover, as a result of SORRs, within these socially disorganized areas in urban
environments, RSOs live in clusters, affecting neighborhoods with the least amount of
resources, lack of access to information, and low social control to bear the brunt of
dealing with RSOs. Studies show concentrations or clusters of ex-offenders breed
criminal activity within socially disorganized areas (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S.
Kirk, 2009; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006). Additionally, Kubrin and Stewart’s (2006) study
of ex-offenders shows that RSOs who reenter into disadvantaged communities recidivate
more than those who live in affluent neighborhoods, regardless of other individual-level
factors. Similarly, Hipp et al.’s (2010) study, which examined the social structural
context of census tracts, found that parolees were returning to socially disorganized
communities and determined that higher concentrated disadvantage and disorder within
these neighborhoods increased recidivism.
When clustering ex-offenders within a particular area, Chamberlain and Wallace
(2015) state that associating with ex-offenders and lack of pro-social relationships can be
a factor in recidivism and neighborhood crime. This mutual tie might bring offenders
together as others in the community, shun them (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015).
Moreover, if ex-offenders return to a socially disorganized community with a cluster of
ex-offenders, they vie against each other for housing, employment, and treatment
(Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; Vischer & Farrell, 2005).
Clustering ex-offenders within a neighborhood might also facilitate legal
cynicism and distrust of law enforcement (D. S. Kirk, 2015). Furthermore, these clusters
hamper the formation of prosocial customs and activities that would decrease criminal
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behavior and instead encourage criminal subculture (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S.
Kirk, 2009; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006). Another possible consequence of clustered
offenders proffers that criminals learn new skills from others (Sutherland, 1947), and
additional criminal opportunities exist in clustered neighborhoods (Osgood, Wilson,
O'Malley, Bachman, & Johnston, 1996).
Recent work adds credence to these suppositions. After the displacement of exoffenders caused by Hurricane Katrina, D. S. Kirk (2015) measured recidivism rates
(based on reincarceration) of ex-offenders released just Post-Katrina and then a second
cohort released a year after Katrina. Post-Katrina, areas of Louisiana experienced
substantial damage to a predominant amount of houses within the city of New Orleans.
As a result, parolees dispersed throughout the state and sometimes out of the state. D. S.
Kirk (2015) captures this displacement from the treatment areas and controls for areas
that did not experience a shift of parolee concentration. The results indicated that as the
parolee concentration number (per 1,000 people) increased, the reincarceration rate
during the one-year measurement period also increased, showing a positive correlation
between the clustering of parolees and recidivism. As such, D. S. Kirk (2015) contended
that the geographic displacement of parolees would bring about an overall reduction in
recidivism.
Intentional Enclaves as a Solution
However, a limited number of planned enclaves of RSOs seem to work in
reducing recidivism. In Colorado, RSOs on probation enter into Shared Living
Arrangements (SLAs) and allow for supportive prosocial relationships with peers and
those in charge of treating and monitoring them (CDPS, 2004). Such SLAs with adequate

51

support such as these can, therefore, have a positive impact on recidivism. Probation
officers and treatment provider's approval of the residence and roommates, and as a
stipulation of living in an SLA, maintain that offenders who live with each other hold
their roommates accountable and report a roommate’s actions or behaviors if they are
inappropriate (CDPS, 2004). Coupled with mandatory treatment for each RSO, RSOs
living in SLAs must account for all of their time adding an extra layer of the behavioral
monitoring. Additionally, probation officers also conduct frequent check-ins with the
treatment providers and the RSOs (CDPS, 2004).
Located in Pahokee, Florida, Restoration Destination facilitates a comparable
experience like that of Colorado’s SLAs with access to housing, treatment, ability to form
pro-social ties to the community, and ease of law enforcement to check on several RSOs
in a confined area (M25M, 2015). However, key differences seem to be the extra layer of
behavioral monitoring by peers and the open and direct lines of communication between
treatment providers and law enforcement. Those that run the facility coach RSOs as to
what they should say to law enforcement or what they do not have to share with law
enforcement when asked questions (J. Kirk, 2015). While the community of RSOs boasts
a low recidivism rate, in 2012, one of its residents pled guilty to raping and killing
Ophelia Redden, 52, and leaving her body under a tree near the community (Duret,
2012). Redden’s mother brought a lawsuit against those involved in renting the facilities
and Matthew 25 Ministries claiming that they recruited sex offenders to live within the
community, putting the population at risk by failing to monitor the RSOs adequately or
provide security for the neighborhood (McCue, 2013). However, over the years, more
than 500 RSOs lived in Miracle Village under the care of Matthew 25
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Ministries/Restoration Destination with very few incidents with local law enforcement
considering it a model community (Schindler, 2018).
Geographic Proximity Versus Relationship Proximity
As discussed in the previous chapter and in tandem with the above studies,
research shows that in the cases of child sex offenses, geographic distance is not the
issue, but rather, social proximity needs to be the focus of concern. In research by Duwe,
Donnay, & Tewksbury (2008) of recidivistic sex offenders in Minnesota between 1990
and 2006, those RSOs reincarcerated for a new sex offense did not contact anyone at the
prohibited places (schools, parks, daycares) covered by the SORRs. Most of the victims
of the new sex offenses (almost 80%) seem to be someone that the victim knows or met
through their social circles (Duwe et al., 2008). Additionally, Colombino, Mercado,
Levenson, & Jeglic (2011) examined adult male sex offenders released from New Jersey
prison between 1996 and 2007 on where they met their victims. Colombino et al. (2011)
found that about 87% of those sex offenders knew their child or adult victim before the
sex offense.
The Gaps in the Literature
Previous studies single out South Florida as an area of concern for RSOs. South
Florida, specifically Broward, Miami-Dade, and Palm Beach, represent counties with a
large portion of the state’s population, as well as a substantial portion of the State’s RSOs
(FDLE, 2015). However, even more concerning is the number of studies that discuss the
fallout of SORRs in the area including lack of housing for RSOs (BTFR, 2009;
Zandbergen & Hart, 2009), the collateral consequences of RSOs not being able to find
employment and housing in Florida (Levenson & Cotter, 2005b; Levenson et al., 2015),
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clustering of RSOs within neighborhoods (Lee-Silcox, 2016), and the disproportionate
rates of transient RSOs to overall population and homelessness imputable to severe
SORRs (Levenson et al., 2013).
However, previous studies regarding clustering and SORRs do not look at the
effect clustering has on individual recidivism rates. An exploratory study looked at where
RSOs live within South Florida and where groups lived (Lee-Silcox, 2016). Other
previous research regarding the impact of SORRs and RSO clustering discusses the
notion that while SORRs might increase clustering of RSOs within the first two years,
after two years, the levels per census block return to normal (Socia, 2012a). However,
Socia (2012a) states that a limitation of this study can be the geography of the study area
(upstate New York) and its makeup and that generalizing these finding should be limited
to similar areas. This study aims to look at a tri-county area containing major
metropolitan cities with extensive state and municipal SORRs and whether these SORRs
cause RSOs to cluster in socially disorganized areas resulting in a higher likelihood to
recidivate.
Summary of Literature Review
Within this literature review, the ideas and impact of mass incarceration, reentry,
and recidivism on RSO are discussed. While these factors impact all ex-convicts, RSOs
deal with additional barriers to reentry with the added pressures of the public registry,
SORRs, and law enforcement monitoring. In particular, SORRs can prevent RSOs from
living with family members, finding stable housing, lack of access to treatment due to
geographic location, and lack of employment opportunity. In turn, all these factors can
promote increased recidivism, RSOs failing to register, and absconding.
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The literature review also addresses RSO recidivism rates and public
misconceptions. While thought to have a high recidivism rate, historically, RSOs
generally recidivate at a lower rate than any other category of offender. Specifically, a
study in Florida by Levenson & Zgoba (2016), show that the rearrest rates for sex
offenders are lower than other offenders, regardless of when sex offender management
policies became law. Additionally, SORRs do not deter RSOs from living in buffer zones
(Blood et al., 2008; CDPS, 2004; MNDOC, 2003; Nobles et al., 2012; Socia, 2012b,
2015; Tewksbury & Jennings, 2010), nor does it impact recidivism or arrests of RSOs
(Nobels et al., 2012).
SORRs impact RSOs trying to find affordable housing, and the more densely
populated an area is, the harder it is to find housing or a landlord willing to rent to them
(Zandbergen & Hart, 2009). These factors also contribute to RSOs living in socially
disorganized areas in clusters (Clark & Duwe, 2015; Hughs & Burchfield, 2008,
Mustaine et al., 2006; Socia & Stamatel, 2012). Socially disorganized areas lack the
resources, social control, collective efficacy, and pro-social relationships that exoffenders need in order not to recidivate (Mustaine & Tewksbury, 2008; Socia &
Stamatel, 2012). Moreover, when ex-convicts cluster, it encourages the formation of
criminal subcultures, distrust of law enforcement, and increased criminal activity and
recidivism (D. S. Kirk, 2015). While intentional enclaves like Restoration Destination try
to promote a place where RSOs can live in harmony with the surrounding community, a
formal evaluation of the program does not exist.
Furthermore, while laws focus on geographic proximity and restrictions to
prevent child sex offenses, the RSO’s social proximity or previous relationship to the
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victim proves to be the abundant method of contacting and choosing a victim in about
80% of the cases (Duwe et al., 2008). While there SORRS limit housing options, which
might include living with family or friends and, as a result, possibly limit access to
potential victims, further research in this area would need to be studied. SORRs appear to
be a smokescreen, put in place by lawmakers in response to public outcry and a handful
of cases, but do not offer actual prevention or protection from sex offenses. This false
sense of security and collateral and unintended consequences will be further explored in
the next sections.
Theoretical Orientation
The next section deals with the theoretical framework for this study. Since this
study deals with multiple questions, it contains several layers of theories as to its
blueprint and foundation. First, the author discusses moral panic and the formation of
laws and the social construction of sex offenders. Next, the unintended consequences of
moral panic examine existing regulations governing sex offenders. Third, social
disorganization theory is used to nest the discussion concerning the impact or lack of
effects neighborhoods have on the recidivism of sex offenders. Finally, the subculture
theory is used as a framework to determine if clusters of sex offenders influence the
recidivism rate of sex offenders. All these theoretical approaches integrate seamlessly
with one another and are well-suited to couch an investigation of this type.
Moral Panic
When looking at sex offender laws ranging over the past few decades, moral
panic often rears as a possible starting point for the call for more and
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stricter laws about sex offenders. Moral panics are described in the following way by
Cohen (1972/2002):
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral
panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to
become deﬁned as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is
presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the
moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other
right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often)
resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and
becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel
and at other times it is something which has been in existence long
enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes
over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other
times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might
produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the
way the society conceives itself (p. 1).
A moral panic occurs in five stages: 1) a group threatens social norms or
community interests, someone, or something, 2) the media portrays this threat in a
simplistic form or symbol, 3) this symbol and its portrayal cause public concern, 4)
authoritative figures, such as law enforcement or policymakers respond to this, and 5) the
uproar and panic over this issue cause changes within the community (Cohen,
1972/2002). Initially, a moral panic lasted for a brief amount of time, possibly expiring
at a faster rate than its rise to social concern (Burchfield et al., 2017). In the recent, third
version of Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Cohen (2002) explicitly addresses the decadeslong moral panic surrounding crimes against children, especially kidnapping,
molestation, and murder committed by sex offenders, and the concept of a sex offender
registry. Cohen (2002) states that these crimes, “Strikes a depth of horror in us all,” and
stir up feelings of vulnerability and empathy (p. xviii). Cohen classifies sex offender
registries under one of the most common and predictable moral panics (2002). Events
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involving children and sex offenders continually stir up attention, the media expresses its
outrage and constructs the image of the sex offender as a monster, the public calls for
change, and the officials respond by passing laws as a safeguard against future events
(2002).
Social Constructionism
While Cohen's definition of a moral panic is rooted in a sequence of events and
interplay, Goode & Ben-Yehuda (1994/2009) approach defining moral panics by
attributes known as social constructions. First, a heightened level of concern exists over
the behavior of a particular group. Then, an increased level of hostility evolves toward
those deviants who are threatening the mores and norms of society (Goode & BenYehuda, 1994/2009). Next, society reaches the consensus that this group and its members
engage in harm towards society and are a threat. Additionally, there is a level of
disproportion where the concern or outrage is in excess concerning the actual damage
(Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994/2009). Finally, panics will ebb and flow, rising and leaving
in roughly the same amount of time (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994/2009).
Media’s role within the creation of a moral panic and its symbology materializes
under social constructionism. Media and its portrayal of events directly impact public
perception and are integral in social constructionism, the change, creation of laws, and
judicial policies (Surette, 2007). In Media, Crime, and Criminal Justice, Surette (2007)
defines social constructionism as, “A theoretical view that knowledge is socially
created...Social constructionism studies the shared ideas, interpretations, and knowledge
that groups of people agree to hold in common” (p. 224). Here, media contributes to a
moral panic in several ways. The press may agenda set, deciding who or what is
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noteworthy, convey assertions made by claim-makers and associated rhetoric, or make
the actual claim with headlines proclaiming moral outrage or moral righteousness
(Cohen, 1972/2002). According to Critcher (2006), fear and anger generated through the
above process prompt an “us” versus “them” mentality, where distortions and emotion
inform the social construction of an issue. This influence is evident in cases of creating
harsh, stricter crime laws over the past 50 years to address the war on drugs, repeat
felons, getting tough on crime, and sex offenders (Critcher, 2006; Surette, 2007).
In the case of sex offenders, emotions range from a heightened sense of
vulnerability and caution to anger and outrage. At the center of these controversies, the
press finds itself in the middle of the upheaval, often igniting and maintaining debate and
helping to sustain emotions (Cohen, 1972/2002; van den Bosch, 2017). The general
public fears and is repulsed by a sexual offender, and they group all sex offenders into
one category of the violent, “stranger danger” sex offender, irrespective of that fact that
these types of offenders are the least likely sex offender on the registry (Goode & BenYehuda, 1994/2009; Harper et al., 2017). The media plays their part in this panic by
falsely labeling sex offenders as being untreatable and guaranteed to recidivate if they
have the opportunity (Bradford et al., 2013) and exploit this exaggeration to the public
and lawmakers through headlines whenever possible (Garland, 2008). In turn, politicians
respond to the public outcries not only ascribable to their constituents’ concern but are
also motivated by political self-preservation as they are elected officials, and any action
deemed to protect children and be tough on crime remains popular (Casady, 2009). For
politicians, the tough on crime stance, continual media headlines, and responding to
public outcry keeps the moral panic around sex offenders in the limelight and a topical
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and permanent state of fear, where the programmed reaction to any policy dealing with
sex offenders is punitive as evidenced below.
Memorial Criminal Justice Policies. Memorial criminal justice policies are
symbolic legislation meant to assuage public fear and named after a victim of a tragic
event having massive media attention and rotation. Such policies are a direct result of
public outcry for reform and change and bring about more stringent laws and stricter
guidelines. The aforementioned Federal and State Laws in the previous section show this
linkage as all are named in memoriam of victims: Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Act of 1994, Megan’s Law (1996),
Jimmy Ryce Act (1999), Jessica’s Law (2005) Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance
(2005), and Adam Walsh Act (2006). Additionally, the statutes declare their purpose by
listing the crimes of notable cases. For example, within the Adam Walsh Act of 2006, 17
victims and brief details of their deaths, covering twenty-five years, are listed, including
Jacob Wetterling, Megan Nicole Kanka, Pam Lychner, Jeseta Gage, Dru Sjodin, Jessica
Lunsford, Sarah Lunde, Amie Zyla, Christy Ann Fornoff, Alexandra Nicole Zapp, Polly
Klaas, Jimmy Ryce, Carlie Brucia, Amanda Brown, Elizabeth Smart, Molly Bish, and
Samantha Runnion.
In all the above instances named, the offender killed their victim, which
dangerously infers that sex offenders often kill their victims (Sample, 2006). These
handfuls of cases are outliers that problematically drive public policy from an emotional
standpoint, usually from outraged parents of the victim and their communities.
Additionally, these policies put forth in the victim’s names might not have even
prevented these tragedies. In many cases, several of the perpetrators traveled to different
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neighborhoods from where their registered residences were to violate their victims (e.g.,
as in the case of Jessica Lunsford and Dru Sjodin) or were omitted as sex offenders
because they had never been convicted of a sex offense (e.g., Danny James Heinrich,
Jacob Wetterling’s killer). Consequently, policymakers create and pass laws from an
emotional perspective without fleshing out the possible unintended outcomes as they
bend to their constituents’ outcry that is informed by media’s depiction of these heinous
but small numbers of crimes.
Unintended Consequences
Laws stemming from these moral panics seemingly redraw ethical boundaries
and reestablish norms (Burchfield et al., 2017). However, under the inherent
disproportionate nature of a moral panic, the actual outcome and the intended outcome
might not align. Furthermore, unintended consequences and blowback occur, including
but not limited to, the difficulty for RSOs to reintegrate into society, as well as minimal
impact on sex offender recidivism (Burchfield et al., 2017; Levenson & Cotter, 2005;
Levenson & Hern, 2007). While the laws mentioned above intended to protect society,
unintended consequences occurred, such as lack of available housing, homelessness,
clustering of RSOs, and absconding sex offenders as a result of the restrictions.
Sociologist Robert Merton described the clash between actions and the
unexpected outcomes of those actions in The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive
Social Action (1936). These consequences arose out of the initiation of the action, or in
this case, because of the launch of residency restrictions and other governing laws.
Merton discussed five reasons why these outcomes would be unanticipated. The first
factor inhibiting a full understanding of the issues at hand is knowledge, ignorance,
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whether it was a result of snap decisions for the need of expediency (i.e., time
constraints), or an infeasibility of comprehensive study resulting from financial
limitations (i.e., fiscal constraints) (Merton, 1936). In the case of memorial criminal
justice laws regarding sex offenders, the public and the media demanded sex offender
registration, community notification, residency restrictions, and more. Policymakers
quickly responded by passing these laws, forever immortalizing victims as the face of
public safety and a warning to all of those who dared speak against these laws. Arguably,
the efficacy of these policies was a separate matter.
While these policies intended to keep the public safe, they also increase the
burden on law enforcement and their resources (BTFR, 2009). The increasing transient
population and differing residency restrictions within Florida made it increasingly more
difficult for law enforcement to track RSOs (Monjeau, 2011). SORRs compel law
enforcement to identify RSOs that fall under FLRR, monitor them, detect violators, and
help the State Attorney’s office with the prosecution (BTFR, 2009). Additionally, the
Department of Corrections reports that probation officers spend a substantial amount of
time with RSOs trying to solve housing problems and running dozens of potential
addresses to try to find one that will be compliant for each RSO and existing SORRs
(BTFR, 2009). Furthermore, Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) reports that on
most nights, a team from the Sexual Predator and Offender Unit drives through the
county with a list of addresses, trying to find transient RSOs and verifying addresses
(Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018). Maintaining the database of RSOs, staffing the
registration, and funding patrol units for address verification diverts the workforce and
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time from other areas that could be addressed. All take a toll on law enforcement
departments and the public at large (BTFR, 2009).
Merton’s (1936) second reason for these results is an error; error in observation of
the situation, in dealing with the circumstances, in determining what should happen, or in
the execution of the plan. A mistake can also occur associated with habitual decisions.
Policymakers recycle previously successful solutions erroneously believing them to work
across all situations. According to Merton (1936), such generic applications are unlikely
to work as social environments change both temporally and spatially. An example of an
error out of habit in Florida is municipalities creating additional residency restrictions
beyond those outlined in the FLRR. By doing so, in most cases, it further narrowed
possible areas for RSOs to live. In other instances, passing these SORRs made their
municipality challenging to be inhabited by any RSO that did not fit in the grandfather
clause.
Linked to the trend of municipalities enacting stricter residency restrictions for
RSOs than that of the state or county, tensions arose between counties and cities as RSOs
relocated to neighboring areas with the least restrictive residency constraint (Monjeau,
2011; Wernick, 2006). The Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) movement tried to banish sex
offenders entirely from communities, which triggered challenges as to the constitutional
validity of these ordinances by RSOs and neighboring municipalities (Wernick, 2006).
By undermining state law, these municipal laws increased transient RSOs and absconding
rates of sex offenders who were released but failed to register or re-register considering
the mounting residence restrictions. In Palm Beach County, the unintended consequences
of RSOs finding a place to live compelled legislators to roll back the RSO restrictions

63

from 2,500 feet from any school, park, daycare center, playground, or other places where
children regularly congregate to 1,000 feet from these designated areas (Laird, 2015).
Subsequently, municipalities within Palm Beach County enacted their NIMBY laws and
reverted to the 2,500 feet restrictions for RSOs.
Thirdly, the imperious immediacy of interest, the stakeholder's interest, or cultural
values can trigger tunnel vision, looking only at immediate consequences versus looking
at long-term benefits or solutions (Merton, 1936). For example, in the case of all the
previously listed legislation, specific instances of brutal violence against a child spawned
an urgency to create laws that would help to protect and prevent cases like these from
reoccurring. These value-driven decisions and subsequent legislation seek to protect the
innocent but, paradoxically, can increase victimization risk through creating a housing
crisis for RSOs that induces recidivism.
As another side-effect of these nascent residency restrictions, scarce, small
pockets of places where RSOs could legally reside developed and, in turn, created
clusters of RSOs (Wernick, 2006). However, in other cases, the deficiency of affordable,
legal housing for RSOs triggers homelessness for a large portion of RSOs, particularly in
densely populated areas like those in South Florida (Ciabotti et al., 2018; Laird, 2015;
Skipp, 2009). These residence restrictions uproot families, make it difficult to find legal,
affordable housing. In turn, the lack of housing options causes difficulty in maintaining a
job or a family, which increases the risk for recidivism (Chajewski & Mercado, 2009;
Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Levenson & Hern, 2007; Mercado et al., 2008). While these
laws were enacted to enforce public safety by creating a sex offender registry and
residency restrictions, the unintended consequences of these policies (i.e., increased
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transience, instability, increased risk factors for recidivism), negate the original intent of
knowing where sex offenders live for effective monitoring and recidivism prevention
(Chajewski & Mercado, 2009; Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Levenson & Hern, 2007;
Mercado et al., 2008; Wernick, 2006).
Lastly, Merton quandaries that since the flawed decision will be part of future
prediction of the subject, the future prediction is inherently flawed (Merton, 1936). At
any level, errors impact the next steps or decisions in policies. If there is an initial
erroneous assessment of the current condition of the situation, an inaccurate evaluation of
the current conditions that can impact the future outcomes, an error in determining a
course of action, or an issue within the implementation, the result from these errors will
always be flawed (Merton, 1936; Payne & DeMichele, 2011). In other words, each step
within the policymaking process can impact the outcome, and if there are errors within
the process, the future predicted result would also be flawed.
In the context of sexual offenders, a highly publicized case with emotional
triggers and violation of social norms generate a frenzied panic, with immediate and
impetuous solutions created as a result. Society feels as if these new memorialized laws
will prevent the same situation from ever happening again; however, this is not the case.
Instead, if the law was created under flawed conditions, the result and future results will
be erroneous as well. Creating flawed laws without looking at short-term and long-term
ramifications repeat this cycle of a self-defeating prophecy (Merton, 1996).
While most of these laws memorialized minors who were accosted by strangers,
in most cases, sex offenders that commit acts on children are relatives, family friends, or
someone who has consistent contact with the child (Casady, 2009; Colombino et al.,

65

2011; Hamilton et al., 2005). In more than 80% of the cases, children know their
attackers, which conflicts with the public portrait of the sex offender as the boogeyman,
ready to jump out of the shadows when least expected. The “stranger danger” sex
offender represents a minority of cases, and existing studies concur (Alexander, 2014;
Hamilton et al., 2005; Sperber et al., 2010). For example, a study by Colombino and
colleagues (2011) determined RSOs whose victims were children met them mostly in
residences (67%) and very few in public places where children congregate (4%). RSOs
whose victims were adults met within a public location like a workplace or bar. As
previously noted, most of the offenders, about 87%, knew their victim before the attack
(Colombino et al., 2011).
Misinforming the public about who is the more likely threat for committing
sexual predation (i.e., stranger vs. known) undermines and detracts from meaningful
messaging for the bulk of cases (Mancini, Shields, Mears, & Beaver, 2010). “Stranger
danger” warnings can create a sense of false security. While a parent might be warning
their child about the RSO on the other block thinking they will be safe if they are
avoiding the stranger, the undermined messaging is that parents need to prepare their
child for the possibility that someone they know or will know might assault them
(Hampson, 2013). Thus, this moral panic and view of the stranger being the danger
prohibit a shift in thinking and policy regarding RSOs even in the face of unintended
consequences.
Social Disorganization Theory
Another of the unintended consequences stemming from RSO residency
restrictions can be that RSOs live in socially disorganized areas. Developed as a socio-
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ecological theory by the Chicago School and popularized by Shaw & McKay (1942),
social disorganization describes a fractured community, unable to attain shared values,
norms, or social control; and when presented with a problem, finds it challenging to come
up with a solution (Bursik, 1988). Upon studying the distribution of juvenile delinquency,
Shaw and McKay (1942) discovered that crime clustered in specific areas, concentrating
near the city center. Once they mapped their results, they determined that the areas with
the highest crime rates correlated to the communities that were the most impoverished
with high residential mobility. They overlaid their findings with the concentric zone
model designed by Park and Burgess (1925) and found that as the distance from the city
center increased, crime decreased. Most crimes take place in the transitional zone, just
outside the business district on the fringe of the residential area. These types of interstitial
spaces are also where the offenders would live (1942). The transitional zones would
exhibit high population turnover, poverty, population heterogeneity, struggle to obtain
informal social controls, cannot regulate antisocial behavior, and allow for delinquency to
occur (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Consequently, as the economic deprivation of a
community and population turnover increases, so does social disorganization, and the
ability of the neighborhood to self-police diminishes (Bursik, 1988; Shaw & McKay,
1942). Thus, these areas will always be neighborhoods where high rates of crime occur.
Conversely, organized communities display solidarity, cohesion, integration, and
exist in the residential and commuters zones (Kubrin et al., 2008; Park & Burgess, 1925;
Shaw & McKay, 1942). Solidarity constitutes an agreement of mores and standards, and
community members desire and value similar goals, such as keeping their neighborhood
crime-free (Kubrin et al., 2008). Cohesion refers to bonding amongst neighbors and
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manifests in residents knowing and liking members of the community (Kubrin et al.,
2008). Lastly, integration represents consistent and frequent social interaction with
neighbors (Kubrin et al., 2008). Solidarity, cohesion, and integration of a neighborhood
cultivate informal social control, which, in turn, prevents crime. Additionally, Sampson,
Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) amplified cohesion within a community by including
collective efficacy, an inclination to intervene and act on behalf of the neighborhood to
prevent illegal activity. These informal mechanisms to prevent crime heavily rely on trust
and solidarity (Sampson et al., 1997).
Within socially disorganized neighborhoods, informal social control such as
surveillance by community members, guardianship, and direct intervention seems to
disappear (Greenberg et al., 1982). Informal control signifies, "the casual but active
observation of neighborhood streets that are engaged in by individuals during daily
activities. It includes recognizing and paying careful attention to strangers in the
neighborhood and keeping an eye on neighbors' homes and property" (Greenberg et al.,
1982, p. 9). These informal control actions that residents of the community display to
combat crime within their communities add to the informal surveillance and deter
criminals from continuing to act (Kubrin & Wo, 2016). Ultimately, informal control can
lead to formal control, i.e., a neighbor witnesses a theft and calls law enforcement.
However, in socially disorganized areas, interceding on behalf of neighbors or those in
the community are less likely to occur (Bursik, 1988).
Furthermore, neighborhood characteristics (poverty, residential instability,
racial/ethnic heterogeneity) indirectly affect crime through their influence on the
formation of social bonds and informal social control (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shaw &
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McKay, 1942). For example, high-levels of transience adds to reducing formal social
controls within a socially disorganized area (Sampson et al., 1997). Rapid population
shifts, or residential mobility, diminishes social controls as forming cohesion through
fostering relationships within a neighborhood take time; ergo, homeownership, and
residential tenure are vital components to preserving social control (Sampson et al.,
1997). Furthermore, concentrated disadvantage decreases collective efficacy as it adds to
population turnover (i.e., residential mobility) because able residents would leave the
community in search of one with better conditions (Andresen, 2014). High levels of
immigration concentration within a neighborhood can also contribute to ethnic and
linguistic heterogeneity and disrupt the realization of similar values and goals among
residents. The lack of social bonds hinders collective efficacy and, as a result, weaken
informal social controls (Sampson et al., 1997).
The concepts behind social disorganization intersect with environmental
criminology, as they both analyze place and space as contributing factors to delinquency.
Specifically, Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) harken to Shaw and McKay’s (1942)
ideas regarding social disorganization and affirm the supposition that space and place
indeed tie offender and delinquency. Additionally, in crime pattern theory, an
individual’s awareness space and activity space determine if and where misconduct will
occur (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981). Awareness space refers to an individual’s
areas which they are familiar with or a “comfort zone” (Brantingham & Brantingham,
1981; Rossmo et al., 2005). Furthermore, an individual’s activity space signifies nodes
of activity that means where they work, live, and play and identify the paths they travel to
and from these activities (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981). Crime pattern theory uses
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the awareness and activity spaces in conjunction with routine activities theory and
rational choice theory to synthesize a comprehensive explanation of crime and
understanding offender and victim’s behavior patterns where space and place play a
crucial role (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981).
Shaw and McKay’s original theory of social disorganization includes a
combination of low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and
family disruption, which leads to neighborhood disorganization and increased crime.
Sampson and Groves (1989) tested this model by looking at two different surveys in
Great Britain, covering 21,935 residents and 538 neighborhoods. In both instances,
Sampson and Groves (1989) found support for Shaw and McKay’s social disorganization
theory in determining that social bonds have an inverse relationship with crime rates (i.e.,
communities with more robust social bonds have lower crime rates). Moreover, low
economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and family disruption
contributed to the overall structure of the neighborhoods and informal controls exerted
(Sampson & Groves, 1989). These findings not only support Shaw and McKay’s theory,
but the study also shows that it is generalizable to other countries and cultures (Sampson
& Groves, 1989).
In another study, Sampson et al. (1997) surveyed 8,782 residents and studied 343
neighborhoods in Chicago, Illinois, to determine if collective efficacy would reduce
violence. The multilevel analyses showed that as the levels of concentrated disadvantage,
immigration concentration, and residential instability increase, collective efficacy within
a neighborhood decreases (Sampson et al., 1997). Respectively, when controlling for
variances in neighborhood, composition, prior violence within a neighborhood, and high
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rates of collective efficacy predicted communities with lower rates of violence (Sampson
et al., 1997).
By publicizing the sex offender registry, the broad assumption is members of the
community can make an informed choice of where to live, where to avoid, monitor RSOs
in their neighborhood, and exhibit informal controls (Socia & Stamatel, 2012).
Simultaneously, another purpose of making the information available to the public is to
act as a deterrent for RSOs because those around them will be informed and act as
guardians (Mustaine & Tewksbury, 2008). However, a study conducted by Socia and
Stamatel (2012) determined that RSOs are more likely to reside in socially disorganized
neighborhoods with less collective efficacy and increased anonymity. Additional studies
support that RSOs move into socially disorganized areas (Clark & Duwe, 2015; Hughs &
Burchfield, 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006). Thus, if an RSO lived, worked, and played in a
socially disorganized area and opted to recidivate, the lack of social controls in that
neighborhood could promote further offenses. Such a scenario represents an unintended
consequence of residency restrictions (Socia & Stamatel, 2012).
Unfortunately, unintended consequences compound when RSOs live in socially
disorganized areas. Even though RSOs are associated with some of the lowest recidivism
rates, experts concur that recidivism rises as RSOs reside in socially disorganized
neighborhoods (Levenson et al., 2013; Mercado et al., 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006;
Wartell, 2009; Wilson, 2009). SORRs can force offenders to live in socially disorganized
areas or rural areas, which limits access to public resources, like transportation and
geographic access to treatment centers that make up integral parts in aiding reentry and
prosocial relationships (Lee-Silcox, 2016; Wartell, 2009; Wilson, 2009). Besides, living
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within these confines diminishes employment prospects and can create a snowball effect
of homelessness and transience (Duwe, 2009; Levenson & Cotter, 2005). The ability to
live in a home with the support of their family, to have a job, and be able to go to
treatment centers are critical for successful reentry and to reducing recidivistic crimes
among released offenders, particularly for RSOs (Duwe, 2009; Preston, 2009; Youstin &
Nobels, 2009). Subsequently, RSOs in South Florida following SORRs, often end up
living in transitional zones in clusters like those seen under the Julia Tuttle Causeway, a
trailer park in Allapattah, an industrial parking lot in Hialeah, and more within the TriCounty area (Rabin, 2014). In most of these instances and as previously discussed, the
RSOs live in inhumane conditions without electricity, running water, shelter, or a
bathroom (McCoy, 2014). Moreover, these transient RSOs repeatedly get evicted and
banished from the location after location after the city or town passes a NIMBY law or
add in a park to prevent RSOs from living in the area (Duwe, 2009; Lee-Silcox, 2016;
Levenson et al., 2013; Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009; Wartell, 2009; Wilson, 2009).
Subculture Theory of Urbanism
Another unintended consequence of instituting residency restrictions is that there
are concentrations or clusters of RSOs, possibly leading to higher recidivism rates.
Fischer’s (1975) subcultural theory of urbanism argues that large cities enhance, create,
and allow deviant subcultures within large urban areas. Fischer (1975) outlines this idea
through four key points, “The more urban a place, the greater its subcultural variety, the
more urban a place, the more intense its subcultures, the more urban a place, the more
numerous the sources of diffusion and the greater the diffusion into a subculture, and the
more urban a place, the higher the rates of unconventionality” (pp. 1324-1328). The first
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contention discusses the idea that greater diversity in people exists on account of the
scope of a city and those drawn to migrate there (Fischer, 1975). The second proposition
regarding the intensity of subcultures relates to the ability to organize a group as a result
of the sheer number of members who believe in the same beliefs, values, norms, and
customs (Fischer, 1975).
Additionally, because of the number of members, there are more opportunities to
interact with each other within the city (Fischer, 1975). Diffusion relates to the adoption
of each other's beliefs and behaviors into group behavior and subsequent acceptance of
all the views and practices (Fischer, 1975). Lastly, the larger the population, the higher
the chance for a wider variety of interests and unconventional, or not socially normative,
groups (Fischer, 1975).
Correspondingly, studies show that neighborhoods with clusters of ex-convicts
impede the creation of pro-social norms and behaviors that would assist in criminal
desistance and promote criminal behavior and subculture (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015;
D. S. Kirk, 2009; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006). The social network created within clusters of
former prisoners can be one of injustice and mistrust in the criminal justice system, which
can lead to spreading the message of distrust of law enforcement and increase illegal
activity (D. S. Kirk, 2015). Taking into consideration all of Fischer and D. S. Kirk’s key
points, in areas of higher concentrations of deviant subcultures, such as those within
RSOs clusters, one might believe that it is the formation, strength, on-going internal
support, and modeling of behaviors and beliefs that cause higher rates of recidivism
within these clusters of RSOs. This complements cultural transmission theory within
socially disorganized neighborhoods where criminal traditions are shared and
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generationally passed down (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Moreover, Katz (1988) contends
those of a subculture learn and share “motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes,”
which add to the subculture and the overall shared way of life (p. 90).
D. S. Kirk’s (2015) study regarding clustering parolees in Louisiana post-Katrina
found that parolee concentration significantly impacted reincarceration. Furthermore, by
needing to disperse parolees throughout the state of Louisiana and out of the state, there
was a reduction in reincarceration when parolees’ concentrations existed at a lower rate
(D. S. Kirk, 2015). Other criminology studies support subculture theory claims regarding
commonality and strength of participation and message. For example, one study analyzed
the connection of members of deviant pedophile online communities and concluded that
these deviant subculture groups, "can connect in ways that validate and support their
[deviant] actions" (Holt et al., 2010, p. 20).
Permeated by scorn and fear by society through SORRs, the fringe grouping of
sex offenders causes an extra layer of stigma versus other ex-convicts who do not have to
deal with residency restrictions, public registries, or the idea of a civil commitment
(Higgins & Rolfe, 2017; Tewksbury, 2005; Zgoba et al., 2009). As a result, RSOs
experience exclusion from housing, employment, social circles, and frequently family
due to SORR restrictions (Esser-Stuart, 2018; Higgins & Rolfe, 2017; Huebner et al.,
2014; Socia & Stamatel, 2012; Tewksbury, 2005). Furthermore, some RSOs cannot
utilize the internet and, therefore, cannot interact in a virtual world with their social
circles even when geographically distant (Higgins & Rolfe, 2017).
This stigma, isolation, and marginalization, which all RSOs experience,
regardless of the tier of offense, bonds this unique group and promotes a subculture with
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shared experiences, everyday struggles, and a united sense of injustice regarding their
treatment within society in comparison to other ex-convicts. On this point, a 2010
qualitative examination by Holt, Blevens, and Burkert (2010) studied five web forums
run by and for pedophiles. The scholars found that the forums supplied a way for
offenders to connect and offer support to each other in a way that they could not engage
with the rest of society. Notably, users of these forums not only traded birthday wishes
and day-to-day ongoings within their lives, the trust between users led to sharing an us
versus them tone as well as messages discussing pedophilia in terms of child love, boy
love, and girl love to denote their feelings of acts that society deems illegal and immoral
(Holt et al., 2010).
Clusters and encampments within the Tri-County area of South Florida are longstanding. While some of the encampments temporarily disband because of evictions,
groups of RSOs keep re-forming in different areas out of a shared desire to maintain
community and social ties. The number of RSOs within these clusters also keep growing
from about 100 RSOs in 2010 living under Julia Tuttle Bridge, to over 260 RSOs in 2018
living in the Westgate streets. The clustering causes increased access to criminal capital,
and the severe SORRs in the Tri-County area make it practically mandatory and almost
guarantee that RSOs live near each other (Tolson & Klein, 2015). These forced clusters,
stemming from SORRs, compel RSOs to live together, either in sparse housing options or
in the streets. With minimal alternatives for socialization with non-RSOs, they band
together, helping the infirm get to a bathroom, looking out for each other, forming their
subculture based on an amalgamation of sexual deviance and marginalization from
society (Gomes, 2017b). The sentiment that RSOs feel like outcasts and they can only
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depend on each other was expressed by residents from the Westgate cluster, “We look
out for each other because no one else does” (Gomes, 2017a, para. 17). Additionally,
anecdotal evidence sometimes depicts occasions when RSOs try to keep each other in
line connected to a fear of law enforcement and reincarceration or additional unwanted
attention to the RSOs (D. S. Kirk, 2015; Kustura, 2015).
A possible exception for a deviant subculture of RSOs might be a formal enclave.
Evidenced in Restoration Destination in Pahokee, Florida, RSOs apply for entrance into
the community. Once approved, they have a place to live, opportunity for consistent
psychological treatment, and a job following these stabilizing factors. These RSOs are
also surrounded by those committed to treatment and have social contact with non-RSOs,
who also believe in their treatment. As such, RSOs are allowed to be a part of the
community. As previously discussed, RSOs living in Restoration Destination apply to get
into the facility, and they do not accept violent offenders, pedophiles, or those convicted
of other crimes such as burglary, robbery, etc. Also, the facility sets up the newly
released RSO with necessary supplies, a room, and some things to help them out as they
transition to their new life, providing positive social reinforcement and hope that RSOs
will be able to be a part of the community regardless of their status (J. Kirk, 2015).
However, while not documented widely, instances still exist within this community that
validates residents looking out for each other to avoid recidivism. The following
exchange documents this practice, “Do you invite somebody to look at your computer?
No! Never! Especially when you know you got porn on it! Gentlemen, I’m gonna tell you
this: Start using your brains” (J. Kirk, 2015, para. 92). This sticktoitiveness sometimes

76

worries law enforcement that RSOs might foster, collaborate, or even cover up for each
other and ultimately recidivate (OPPAGA, 2018).
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III.

METHOD

This study explores three research questions regarding registered sex offenders
(RSOs), Florida state residency restrictions, and the unintended consequences of passing
additional guidelines at the municipality-level. This section will outline each question,
accompanying hypothesis, the data, independent and dependent variables, and the
analytical methods employed to examine each question. Additionally, each question
originates with the RSO sample below from the FDLE and the geocoding process
outlined below.
RSO Sample
Available publicly through a website and per SORNA, FDLE maintains a
comprehensive listing of RSOs in Florida. The original listing from November 5, 2015,
includes sexual predators and offenders, those who have died (kept on file for one year as
public notice), absconded, confined, deported, released, and still needing to register. This
list also contains those under the supervision of the State of Florida and the federal
government through their terms of probation (FDLE, 2015). The listing catalogs first,
middle and the last names, race, sex, hair color, height, weight, birthdate, Florida
Department of Corrections’ (FLDOC) number, permanent, temporary, or transitional
address, if the victim was a minor, status as either a sexual offender or sexual predator,
and has a link to the offender's mug shot. While there are statutory and definition
differences between registered sex offenders and predators that are linked to the age of
the victims as well as the number of instances, for this study, when the term RSO is
utilized, both terms are included.
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This study explores the RSOs listed within Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm
Beach Counties located in South Florida. According to the FDLE listing of RSOs on
November 5, 2015, in the Tri-County area, 4,411 RSOs live in Miami-Dade (n = 2094),
Broward (n = 1281) and Palm Beach (n = 1036) Counties (FDLE, 2015). However, the
nature of this study dictates the list-wise deletion of any RSOs in the study that are
classified as deceased, confined, deported, and those who have absconded, as their
location was either no longer a threat to the community or they could not be tracked. As
a result, the total number of relevant and trackable RSOs in the Tri-County area is 3,892,
located in Miami-Dade (n = 1767), Broward (n = 1157), and Palm Beach (n = 968).
Geocoding & Buffering Process
To answer the three research questions posed, all of the RSO addresses will be
geocoded within ArcGIS Pro, version 2.4.2 (Environmental Systems Research Institute
[ESRI], 2019). For this study, the researcher chooses to use street centerline address
ranges to geocode versus parcel data. Parcel data has been deemed as the higher standard
in geocoding due to the higher level of precision in pinpointing an exact address
(Zandbergen & Hart, 2009). However, frequently, an RSO address can be a street
intersection or omit an exact address or unit number, which makes parcel coding of those
addresses as guesswork (Zgoba et al., 2009). Using street centerline address ranges omits
the need for guesswork that parcel data would require in the event of incomplete address
specifying exact units. For that reason, street centerline address ranges provide the most
consistent method in geocoding this study’s sample addresses (Zandergen & Hart, 2009;
Zandbergen et al., 2010; Zgoba et al., 2009).
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To maximize the number of geocoding matches from the street address, the
researcher cleaned up the permanent, temporary, and transient home addresses. This
process included checking each address, looking for misspellings, errors, eliminating
apartment numbers, and correcting the formatting of cross-streets (by using “&” between
street names). As a result of cleaning the data and geocoding using the ArcGIS Online
World Geocoding Service, the total RSO sample size for the Tri-County area is 3,826
RSOs in Miami-Dade (n = 1750), Broward (n = 1123), and Palm Beach (n = 953)
Counties. The original sample was decreased by 66 RSOs, due to non-matching or
unverifiable addresses. This reduction represents less than 2% of the overall sample size,
which is minimal and within the standard acceptance level regarding geocoding addresses
(Berenson & Appelbaum, 2011; Clontz & Mericle, 2004; Hipp et al., 2011; Hughes &
Kadleck, 2008; Zandbergen & Hart, 2009). The following research questions and analysis
is based on this RSO sample size (n = 3,826) for Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach
Counties in South Florida.
Research Question 1
Research Question
The first research question addresses whether or not RSOs in Miami-Dade,
Broward, and Palm Beach Counties adhere to the Florida State Statute 775.215, which
requires RSOs to live further than 1,000 feet of a school, childcare facility, park, or
playground.
Research Question 1 Hypothesis
Based upon prior literature, other states, counties, and municipalities experienced
RSOs violating buffer zones regarding residency restrictions (Berenson & Appelbaum,
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2011; Grubesic et al., 2007; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008). Due in part to the
concentration of schools, childcare facilities, parks, and playgrounds within the study
area, and the extent of the 1,000 feet buffer zone around these areas, RSOs are not 100%
compliant to Florida State Statute. Furthermore, in a combination of the extensive
residency restriction buffer zones and the scarcity of affordable housing within these
areas, RSOs violate residency restrictions (Berenson & Appelbaum, 2011; Grubesic et
al., 2007; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008).
While the concentration of restricted sites and lack of affordable housing can be
neighborhood factors on a macro level, those factors are not controlled by the RSO.
Although the literature suggests that the residency restrictions drive and dictate where an
RSO lives, this research question seeks to explore if individual factors contribute to
deciding on where an RSO resides. As a result, this first research question studies an
RSO’s status as an offender or predator, whether or not the victim at the time of the
incident was a minor, and if the RSO residential classification is transient (homeless).
Under more scrutiny than the classification of offenders, those classified as
predators and convicted of more heinous crimes, have an extra layer of registration
protocols, including, but not limited to an increase in the frequency of checking-in and
updating their RSO profile with local law enforcement, additional residency restrictions,
and added employment restrictions (The Florida Legislature, 2019). Since predators
receive extra attention and restrictions, predators will be less likely to violate FLRR.
Furthermore, as previously discussed, communities and states passed residency
restrictions to protect minors within their neighborhoods. With that in mind, this study
analyzes whether or not the RSO’s victim was a minor at the time of the incident and if
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that plays into an RSO violating the FLRR buffer zones. Again, with the increased
scrutiny that RSOs receive in South Florida, RSOs convicted of a sex crime with a victim
who was a minor would not violate FLRR.
Lastly, the research question investigates if being a part of the transient RSO
population would be a predictor in violating FLRR. Prior literature maintains that
homeless RSOs are inherently homeless due to adhering to the severe residency
restrictions (Levenson & Cotter, 2005b). This study expects to find similar results.
Research Question 1 Data and Sample
This research question uses the above mentioned geocoded sample of RSOs in the
Tri-County area. While there are different residency restrictions regarding types of
offenders (predator or offender) and variances based on municipality, for this study,
Florida’s residency restriction requirement of 1,000 feet will be used. In order to
determine if RSOs live in violation of FLRR, geocoded shapefiles for public, private, and
charter schools, childcare facilities, parks, and playground sites for the study’s counties
were acquired from Florida Geographic Data Library (FGDL), a public database under
the University of Florida GeoPlan Center (Florida Geographic Data Library [FGDL],
2019).
Next, to simulate FLRR boundaries, 1,000-feet buffers will be added around each
site where children congregate as dictated by law. Overlapping buffers will be dissolved
to create connecting buffer boundaries surrounding the restricted places where children
congregate. Then, the point intersections between the buffer zones and any RSOs
residences intersecting within the buffer zones will be aggregated by count.
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Research Question 1 Variables
Dependent variable
For the first research question, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure,
dummy-coded, of whether an RSO, within the sample, did (n = 1) or did not (n = 0)
violate FLRR within Miami-Dade, Broward, or Palm Beach Counties as of November 5,
2015. In the present study, 41% of RSOs violated FLRR.
Independent variables
The independent variables within the first research question measure individuallevel characteristics of an RSO, which might impact if they would violate FLRR. An
RSO’s status is a dichotomous variable as predator (yes = 1; no = 0), which constituted
12%, whether or not the victim at the time of the incident was a minor (yes = 1; no = 0)
which consisted of 78% of the cases, and if the RSO residential classification is transient
(homeless) (yes = 1; no = 0), which comprised of 19% of RSOs. Subsequently, this
research question controls for other demographic variables such as race where White
RSOs for the study area accounts for roughly 62%, 38% Black RSOs, and nominal
amounts of Asian (n = 9) and Native (n = 8) RSOs. Since the categories of Asian and
Native are nominal, and other questions within the study address Blacks as historically
possessing a larger disadvantage, for the sake of continuity, the race will be coded as
Black is encoded “1” and all other races encoded as “0”. Furthermore, age is a
continuous interval variable in years based on the inception of the study on November 5,
2015, with a median age of 51 at the time of the study. Table 1 shows the descriptive
statistics regarding this research question.

83

Research Question 1 Analytic Strategy
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, the analysis will use a logistic
regression model to determine what individual variables are associated with violating the
1,000-foot buffer zone residency restrictions from the prohibited sites. At its core,
multiple logistic regression helps to predict a dichotomous categorical variable based on a
set of the independent variable(s). Multiple logistic regression maintains that at least 20
cases are needed for each variable, data is cross-sectional, and causality runs in one
direction. Also, micro (individual-level) data, such as this study’s sample, may be used in
this model.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Research Question 1

Variable

M

SD

Min

Max

RSO violators of FLRRa

.41

.49

0

1

Sexual predatora

.12

.33

0

1

Victim under 18a

.78

.41

0

1

Transient RSOa

.19

.39

0

1

50.64

13.53

17

95

.38

.49

0

1

Age

Blacka

Note. N = 3,826. a Means for variables that are dichotomously coded can be interpreted as
proportions.
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Research Question 2
Research Question
The second research question explores if clusters of RSOs fall within socially
disorganized areas within the Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties by
looking at nested individual and neighborhood variables.
Research Question 2 Hypothesis
Previous studies conclude that RSOs live within socially disorganized areas upon
reentry. Past clusters in the Tri-County area (i.e., Julia Tuttle Causeway, Westgate)
would indicate that transient groups of RSOs in compliance with the statute would be
located near industrial areas, trailer home parks, motels, and other socially disorganized
areas. Additionally, the literature claims that finding stable housing is a critical
component in the reentry process. However, studies demonstrated that the existence of
severe residency restrictions inherently promotes the clustering of RSOs since it restricts
the amount of affordable RSO housing options (Barnes et al., 2009; Zandbergen & Hart,
2009; Zgoba et al., 2009). While other studies address RSO clustering (Grubesic et al.,
2007; Hughes & Burchfield, 2008; Hughes & Kadleck, 2008; Lee-Silcox, 2016; Mustaine
et al., 2006; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008) and spatial distribution within urban and rural
areas (Chajewski & Mercado, 2009; Socia, 2011, 2012a; Socia & Stamatel, 2012), those
studies do so solely on a macro, neighborhood level, and do not use a nested model
controlling for individual factors.
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Research Question 2 Data and Sample
For this research question, neighborhood and individual factors will be collected
and analyzed. Census tracts for the tri-county area will be used as an alternative measure
for neighborhoods, which is prevalent within previous studies in this field (Kubrin &
Stewart, 2006). Neighborhood data acquired from the 2010 United States Census (U.S.
Census) and the 2012 American Community Survey (ACS) via the public database
American FactFinder (United States Census Bureau [USCB], 2010, 2012) will also be
utilized in the current study. Census tract shapefiles for the tri-county area will be
acquired from another public database maintained by the USCB, TIGER/Line (USCB,
2015). As part of the geocoding process for this research question, the data from the 2010
U.S. Census, the 2012 ACS, and tri-county shapefiles will be added in ArcGIS Pro to the
aforementioned original sample data.
Additionally, using the original sample data geocoded within ArcGIS Pro,
creating a spatial weights matrix file by calculating the inverse weighted distance of each
RSO to the nearest five RSOs determines distance decay.
Research Question 2 Variables
Dependent variable
For the second research question, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of
whether an individual RSO lives within a cluster of RSOs, as defined by a positive
inverse distance weight (distance decay) z-score (yes = 1; no = 0). Further information
regarding inverse distance weighing and distance is forthcoming in the Analytical
Strategy section for this research question. In the present study, 24% of the RSO sample
lives in clusters.
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Independent variables
As noted, this research question looks at individual-level variables nested within
neighborhood-level variables to determine if RSOs cluster within socially disorganized
areas.
Individual-level. In this study, these individual-level variables are accounted for:
an RSO’s status is a dichotomous variable as predator (yes = 1; no = 0), whether or not
the victim at the time of the incident was a minor (yes = 1; no = 0), if the RSO residential
classification is transient (homeless) (yes = 1; no = 0), if the RSO violated FLRR (yes =
1; no = 0), and if the RSO recidivated (rearrested) between November 5, 2015 and
November 5, 2018. Subsequently, while some of these predictors are not utilized within
this research question, common demographic variables are also included. Race variables
account for roughly 62% White RSOs, 38% Black RSOs, and nominal amounts of Asian
(n = 9) and Native (n = 8) RSOs. Since the categories of Asian and Native are nominal,
and this question addresses Blacks as historically possessing a larger disadvantage, for
the sake of continuity, the race will be coded as Black is encoded “1” and all other races
encoded as “0”. Additionally, age is a continuous interval variable in years based on the
inception of the study on November 5, 2015, with a median age of 51-years-old at the
time of the study. Table 2 illustrates the descriptive statistics regarding this research
question.
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Table 2
Individual Level Descriptive Statistics for Research Question 2

Variable

M

SD

Min

Max

IDWa

.24

.43

0

1

RSO violators of FLRRa

.41

.49

0

1

Sexual predatora

.12

.33

0

1

Victim under 18a

.78

.41

0

1

Transient RSOa

.19

.39

0

1

.23

.42

0

1

50.64

13.53

17

95

.38

.49

0

1

RSO arresteda
Age
Blacka

Note. N = 3,826. aMeans for variables that are dichotomously coded can be
interpreted as proportions.
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Neighborhood-level. In this research question, the primary neighborhood-level
variable being examined is social disorganization. Comprised of a calculation of
concentrated disadvantage, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability, social
disorganization measures the economic deprivation and collective efficacy within a
neighborhood. These factors contribute to and can determine levels of informal social
control within communities. Three other census tract variables will be used as control
variables, the number of RSOs within a census tract, the population density (based on
total population divided by the land area in square miles), and the housing density (based
on the number of houses divided by the land area in square miles). Since Miami-Dade,
Broward, and Palm Beach contain rivers, lakes, or coastal lands, the current study looks
at density rate based on the landmass to capture population and housing density. Table 3
elucidates the descriptive statistics regarding this research question.
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Table 3
Synthetic Clusters Census Tract Level Descriptive Statistics for Research Question 2

Variable

M

SD

Min

Max

Social disorganization

0.14

0.56

-0.93

1.13

Number of RSO FLRR violators

30.50

17.02

5

74

Number of RSO arrests

16.69

20

1

131

Total number of RSOs

74.46

52.75

19

295

Population density (based on land area)

3881.63

2122

89

8424

Housing density (based on land area)

1699.73

968.41

28

4226

Note. N = 52.
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Research Question 2 Analytic Strategy
For this research question, due to the nested variables, Hierarchical General
Linear Modeling (HGLM) using synthetic clusters will be conducted utilizing IBM’s
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 26.0 (International Business Machines
[IBM], 2019) and Scientific Software International’s (SSI) HLM 8.0 software
(Raudenbush et al., 2019). HGLM will be used to decipher the relationship between the
recidivism to individual and neighborhood socioeconomic factors to answer the pertinent
research questions. HGLM allows for the studying of connections between two levels in
the analysis and keeps the possibility for variability related to each level of the hierarchy.
For this model, since the dependent variable is dichotomous, a Bernoulli
distribution will be utilized and assumes that the only possible outcomes are 0 and 1,
versus using a Gaussian, which would dictate a normal distribution of continuous
measurement (Hox, Moerbeek, & van de Schoot, 2017). By using logistic regression with
a Bernoulli distribution, this method employs logit linear transformation and computes
the inherent logarithmic odds of an observed relationship when the dependent variable
does not fit in a normal distribution (Schroeder, Sjoquist, & Stephan, 2017).
However, one of the stipulations of utilizing HGLM is the need to have at least 20
independent observations in the Level 1 category that nest within the Level 2 category
(Clarke & Wheaton, 2007). In this research question, RSOs will be the Level 1 unit, and
census tracts will be the Level 2 units. There are several census tracts with less than 20
RSOs. Nonetheless, by utilizing synthetic clusters, this allows for the grouping of like
census tracts and combines the overall number of RSOs in order to fit the HGLM model.
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Synthetic clustering can be used as an option when wanting to study several
groups, but those groups might have a smaller quantity of individual data per group or
data sparseness. Clarke & Wheaton’s (2007) study examined the validity of utilizing
synthetic clusters and concluded that synthetic clustering is a valid method. However,
they cautioned that researchers should try to keep the integrity of the group size (Level
2). Additionally, other studies concur with Clarke & Wheaton that as the group size
decreases through manipulation, this can reduce contextual effects (Maas & Hox, 2005;
McNeish, 2014). Additional information regarding the clustering method forthcoming
within this section.
For this research question, the sample census tracts containing RSOs (n = 890)
will be grouped based upon concentrated disadvantage z-scores, which encompass the
percent of the individuals below the poverty line, percent of individuals on public
assistance, percent unemployed, percent less than age 18, and the percent of femaleheaded households within each census tract (The Association of Maternal & Child Health
Programs [AMCHP], 2014). Based on previous studies, hierarchical cluster analysis will
be initially conducted in SPSS 26.0, utilizing Ward’s method to calculate the similarity
between clusters with a general measure of a squared Euclidean distance for k-nearest
neighbors (Cutrona et al., 2000). From the range of results, the researcher chooses the
cluster grouping that combines the least amount of census tracts to obtain a minimum of
20 RSOs in each synthetic cluster. Initially, the researcher chooses the closest grouping
with at least 20 Level 1 observations per Level 2 group and will manually match the
smaller clusters containing less than 20 RSOs with other groups in order to fill the
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requirements to run an HLM model. The process resulted in 52 synthetic clusters with 20
or more RSOs in each census tract synthetic cluster.
Social Disorganization
The factors that make up social disorganization are concentrated disadvantage,
residential instability, and ethnic heterogeneity. For this research question, the
Association of Maternal and Child Health Programs’ (AMCHP) definition and
calculation of concentrated disadvantage is utilized (AMCHP, 2014). In analyzing
concentrated disadvantage, AMCHP takes into account the following elements from the
2012 ACS (for aligning with the 2010 U.S. Census figures): the percent of the individuals
below the poverty line, percent of individuals on public assistance, percent unemployed,
and percent less than age 18. Also, the percent of female-headed households will be
acquired from the 2010 U.S. Census. By using all of the information from the census
tracts, each of the variables will be transformed into a z-score and then averaged to come
up with the final concentrated disadvantage z-score. Those z-scores, which fall at and
above the 75th percentile of values, define areas of high concentrated disadvantage
(AMCHP, 2014).
Traditionally, in the criminal justice field and its literature, concentrated
disadvantage includes the above factors as well as the percentage of Blacks within the
area of analyzation (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson et al., 1997). However, in
determining concentrated disadvantage factors, AMCHP (2014) decided that including
race seemed mismatched as the other factors are predominately economically driven.
AMCHP contacted Robert J. Sampson, a recognized expert regarding social
disorganization, whose works are rooted in Chicago neighborhoods (which are highly
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segregated). Sampson “agreed that there is nothing inherent in racial composition that is
disadvantageous” (AMCHP, 2014, p.4). The article continues with both the AMCHP and
Sampson discussing the need for the researcher to determine the interpretation of
concentrated disadvantage without race as an indicator based on the geographic area of
study and the possibility of segregated communities.
In the past 50 years, Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties’
population and demographics have drastically shifted (USCB, 2019; World Population
Review, 2019). Experiencing high rates of population and financial growth, the tri-county
area and its residents are ever-changing. While there were pockets of segregated
communities, based more on ethnicity (e.g., Little Havana and Little Haiti) in the 1990s
and 2000s, the growth of the area in population and real estate needs drastically shifted
the demographics of the residents of these areas (Florida International University [FIU]
Metropolitan Center, 2014). As a result of the ever-changing demographics within the
study area, the concentrated disadvantage will be a variable focused on the economic
means of a census tract, versus the race of the residents.
This is not to say that in other parts of the country or even within parts of this
study area that racial segregation and lack of opportunity based on race does not exist at
differing levels. Instead, the individual researcher should look at the total geographic area
of study, patterns of growth, and changes in demographics and residency to make the best
determination as to what would be the appropriate course for their research.
Residential instability is calculated using two factors: homeowners that have lived
in their residence less than five years and renters within a census tract. Within social
disorganization, residential instability serves to measure social bonds within a
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neighborhood (Anderson et al., 2015; Kubrin & Wo, 2016; Sampson et al., 1997).
Scholars reason that homeowners are more invested in the neighborhood and are more
likely to practice informal social control, and therefore, deter criminals from committing
crimes within the area for fear of being caught or reported or reduce crime rates due to
more vigilant oversight by the community members (Sampson et al., 1997). Just like
concentrated disadvantage, the factors will be transformed into z-scores and averaged to
produce residential instability value.
Ethnic heterogeneity is calculated using the percentage of Hispanic and the
percentage of foreign-born population within each census tract. Under the theory of
social disorganization, the measurement of ethnic heterogeneity is associated with
neighbors sharing the same mores and values due to similar race and cultural
backgrounds (Kubrin & Wo, 2016). In turn, this cohesiveness within a neighborhood
translates to increased informal social control and a negative correlation with crime. To
be in line with concentrated disadvantage, both factors are z-score transformed and
averaged to produce the ethnic heterogeneity value.
Social disorganization is the culmination of concentrated disadvantage, residential
instability, and ethnic heterogeneity. While studies differ regarding weighing each factor,
for this research question, each element retains its value without additional emphasis.
Due to the synthetic clustering of census tracts for the overall calculation of social
disorganization, the values for concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, and
ethnic heterogeneity for individuals census tracts will be aggregated and averaged to the
new synthetic census tract.
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Inverse Distance Weighted Interpolation and Clustering
In this research question, for the dependent variable, which is dichotomous,
clustering is defined as having a positive inverse distance weighted interpolation
(IDW)/distance decay z-score (yes = 1; no = 0). Distance decay describes the effect of
distance on relationships and surmises that the spatially closer two things or people are,
the more they are related. Conversely, the distance decay holds that the more distance
between two locations, people or things, the more dissimilar and less influential on each
other (Pun-Cheng, 2016). When looking at methods of clustering, studies used the five
closest people or choices to be a universal number when measuring the similarity of
people (Ajzen, 1991; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2017; Jeh & Widom,
2002; Miller, 1956; Yang et al., 2011) or the distance between RSOs and the nearest
number of RSOs (Socia, 2013). Inverse distance weighted interpolation tool in ArcGIS
Pro also assumes that closer proximity points equal more significant similarity versus
points that are further apart (ESRI, n.d.). IDW allows for a higher value assigned to the
closest data point or neighbor.
The first step in generating this variable is to utilize the original sample of RSOs
and its geocoding and mapping to calculate the inverse weighted distance of each RSO to
the nearest 5 RSOs within a spatial weights matrix file in ArcGIS Pro. While prior
research focused primarily on where the RSO clusters are within an area (Grubesic et al.,
2007; Hughes & Burchfield, 2008; Hughes & Kadleck, 2008; Lee-Silcox, 2016; Mustaine
et al., 2006; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008), one scholar who examined the effects
SORRs and clustering utilized the next nearest neighbor analysis of each RSOs to the
closest five RSOs (Socia, 2012a, 2013). Each RSO’s IDW value depicts the measurement

97

of the five closest RSOs to each RSO. These values will be transformed to z-scores and
dummy coded to reflect an individual RSO living within a cluster of RSOs (1 = clustered;
0 = not clustered).
Research Question 3
Research Question
The third research question addresses if unforeseen and unintended consequences
of residency restrictions for the community-at-large result when RSOs cluster within a
census tract in the form of recidivism.
Research Question 3 Hypothesis
There is a direct correlation between recidivism and clustering since the residency
restrictions push RSOs to live in limited, socially disorganized areas in clusters of other
RSOs with exposure to deviant subcultures, which is detrimental to their successful
reentry progress. Previous studies show that groups of ex-convicts in neighborhoods
encumber pro-social behavior and customs and instead, encourage criminal behavior and
subculture (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2009; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006).
Additionally, the social network generated within clusters of former prisoners can possess
and stir up feelings of injustice and distrust in the criminal justice system, which can lead
to an increase in illegal activity (D. S. Kirk, 2015). In looking at friendship networks,
studies show that people are close friends with a select few people, ranging from 3 to 5
close friends (Dunbar, 2010; Marsden, 1985; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Brashears,
2006; van der Horst & Coffe, 2012). Furthermore, the similarity in deviant habits (Katz,
1988; Steglich, Snijders, & Pearson, 2010), and geographic proximity (Ebbesen et al.,
1976; Preciado et al., 2012) matter in creating and maintaining friendships. As a result of
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shared deviant beliefs coupled with geographic proximity to foster and cultivate those
friendships, a higher rate of recidivism of RSOs will occur where RSOs live closer
together in clusters.
Research Question 3 Data and Sample
Using the original November 5, 2015, RSO sample data list, new information was
requested from the FDLE by using their Department of Correction’s number and
birthdate to obtain a listing of those RSOs who have been rearrested between November
5, 2015, and November 5, 2018. As this study is measuring a snapshot of recidivism, this
number would only be indicative of RSOs who were compelled to register before
November 5, 2015, and not any RSOs after the time, as mentioned in the above period.
For this research question, since it is such a constricted time-period, recidivism will be
defined as a new arrest within 36 months between November 5, 2015, and November 5,
2018.
Research Question 3 Variables
Dependent variable
For the third research question, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure
of whether an RSO recidivated, as defined by a new arrest after November 5, 2015, and
on or before November 5, 2018, (yes = 1; no = 0).
Independent variables
For this research question, the following individual levels are accounted for
according to the study’s sample as discussed earlier in the chapter: an RSO’s status as
determined by FDLE is a dichotomous variable as a predator (yes = 1; no = 0), which is
12% of the sample, if the RSO residential classification is transient (homeless) (yes = 1;
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no = 0), or 19% of the sample, if the RSO violated FLRR (yes = 1; no = 0), which is 41%
of the sample, and the inverted weighted distances which are transformed to z-scores.
Control variables include race and age. Race variables account for roughly 62% White
RSOs, 38% Black RSOs, and nominal amounts of Asian (n = 9) and Native (n = 8)
RSOs. Since the categories of Asian and Native are nominal, and other questions within
the study address Blacks as historically possessing a more substantial disadvantage, for
the sake of continuity, the race will be coded as Black is encoded “1” and all other races
encoded as “0”. Also, age is a continuous interval variable in years based on the inception
of the study on November 5, 2015. Table 4 illustrates the descriptive statistics regarding
this research question.
Research Question 3 Analytic Strategy
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, the analysis will use a multiple
logistic regression model to determine what individual variables are associated with
recidivism. Inherently, logistic regression helps to predict a dichotomous categorical
variable based on a set of the independent variable(s). As noted for the previous question,
logistic regression maintains that at least 20 cases are needed for each variable, data is
cross-sectional, and causality runs in one direction. Also, micro (individual-level) data,
such as this study’s sample and calculated IDW from Research Question 2, will be used
in this model.
IDW allows for a higher value assigned to the closest data point or neighbor. This
measurement operationalizes distance decay and friendship networks between
neighboring RSOs. The higher the IDW value, the more clustered each RSO is to five
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other RSOs. Determining spacial proximity to other members with a similar proclivity to
commit like deviant acts assess friendship networks and subculture theory.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Research Question 3

Variable

M

SD

Min

Max

RSO arresteda

.23

.42

0

1

.00009

1.00

-.49

2.37

FLRRa

.41

.49

0

1

Sexual Predatora

.12

.33

0

1

Victim under 18a

.78

.41

0

1

Transient RSOa

.19

.39

0

1

50.64

13.53

17

95

.38

.49

0

1

IDW
RSO violators of

Age

Blacka

Note. N = 3,826. a Means for variables that are dichotomously coded can be
interpreted as proportions.

102

IV.

ANALYSIS

Divided into three parts and covering each research question, this chapter presents
the results of the current study.
Research Question 1
The first research question analyzes whether or not RSOs in Miami-Dade,
Broward, and Palm Beach Counties adhere to FLRR, which requires RSOs to live further
than 1,000 feet of a school, childcare facility, park, or playground. Since the dependent
variable is dichotomous and captured if the RSO violated FLRR (encoded 1) or did not
violate the buffer zone as dictated by FLRR (encoded 0), a logistic regression model was
used with robust standard errors to determine the coefficients of the RSO’s
characteristics. The coefficients generated in the initial equation do not hold any
interpretive value. Presented in odds-ratios, exponentiated coefficients subtracted from
one and multiplied by 100 represent the percent change in the likelihood that an RSO will
violate FLRR.
Because the omnibus chi-square test for the full model is statistically significant
(x2 = 191.483, df = 5, p < .001), the current model with the independent variable is
substantially better than the simple baseline model. Per the Nagelkerke R2 value of 0.066,
the independent variables included in the logistic regression account for approximately
6.6% of the variation in the likelihood of an RSO violating FLRR. The results of the
Hosmer and Lemeshow test for goodness of fit for the logistic regression model finds that
the model with the associated variables is a suitable fit (x2 = 4.761, p > .05). Additionally,
a correlation analysis of the variables in regards to multicollinearity and no issues exist.
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The independent variables in the first research question study the deterrent effects
of FLRR in testing if sexual predators, those with minor victims, and homeless RSOs
violate FLRR while controlling for age and race. Sexual predators (encoded 1) versus
sexual offenders (encoded 0) usually commit more severe sexual acts, sometimes
multiple times or on multiple victims. The second independent variable looks at each
RSO’s case and records if the victim is a minor (encoded 1) or not (encoded 0). The third
independent variable takes into account an RSO’s housing stability and denotes if the
RSO is homeless (encoded 1) or not homeless (encoded 0). Additionally, the model for
research question 1 utilizes the control variables of age and race. As previously
mentioned, Table 1 shows descriptive statistics, and additionally, Table 5 displays the
results of the analysis and shows that five out of the six variables are extremely
significant (p < .001).
FLRR focuses on places where children congregate and use environmental
criminology, specifically routine activities theory, to operationalize distance decay from a
criminological perspective in that the further away an RSO lives from where children
congregate, the less likely they would commit an act against a child. In analyzing
predators, the appearance of minor victims, and homeless RSOs, research question 1
seeks to understand what individual-level variables, if any, contribute to violating FLRR.
Predators
Predators constitute 12% (n = 472) of the overall sample, and in the current
model, appear as extremely statistically significant (p < .001). Controlling for other
independent variables included in the model, the odds of a predator violating FLRR is
approximately 44% lower than an RSO classified as an offender.
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The Victim is Under 18
Out of the 3,826 RSOs, 78% of the cases reported victims under 18 (n = 2,995).
In the current model, those cases with minor victims emerge as extremely statistically
significant (p < .001). Controlling for other independent variables included in the model,
the odds of an RSO with a previous conviction with a minor victim violating FLRR is
approximately 33% less than an RSO with a non-minor victim.
Transient RSOs
Homeless RSOs represent 19% (n = 716) of the total sample and show as
statistically significant (p < .001). Controlling for other independent variables included in
the model, the odds of a homeless RSO violating FLRR is approximately 33% lower than
an RSO who lives in a home.
Control Variables
Additionally, the control variables of age and race, specifically RSOs who are
Black appears as extremely significant (p < .001). However, while age shows as
statistically significant, the positive odds-ratio of 1.3% is almost negligible. On the other
hand, race, dummy-coded as Black (encoded 1) and non-Black (encoded 0), which would
include White, Asian, and Native RSOs, also emerges as extremely significant (p < .001).
Representing 38% of RSOs, Black RSOs account for 1,456 of the overall sample.
Controlling for the other independent variables included in the model, the odds of a Black
RSO violating FLRR are higher by about 108% over other races (White, Asian, Native).
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Table 5
Logistic Regression Predicting the RSO Violators of 1,000-foot Buffer Zones per FLRR for Research Question 1
95% CI
B

SE

Wald

df

p

Exp(B)
LL

UL

Predator

-0.586

0.110

28.269

1

0.000

0.556

0.448

0.691

Victim under 18

-0.401

0.081

24.336

1

0.000

0.670

0.571

0.785

Transient RSO

-0.399

0.092

18.904

1

0.000

0.671

0.561

0.803

Black

0.730

0.072

101.899

1

0.000

2.076

1.801

2.392

Age

0.012

0.003

23.235

1

0.000

1.013

1.007

1.018

Constant

-0.820

0.157

27.357

1

0.000

0.440

Note. N = 3,826. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit
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Research Question 2
The second research question examines individual-level variables and census tract
synthetic clusters to determine if clusters of RSOs fall within socially disorganized areas.
In order to accomplish this goal, the current study utilized a hierarchical generalized
linear model (HGLM), which allows for nested analysis of individual-level variables
within a neighborhood-level context. For this model, research question 2 analyzed 3,826
RSOs within the Tri-County area nested within 52 synthetic census tracts. Since the
dependent variable is dichotomous and designated as an RSO living within a cluster of
RSOs, represented by a positive IDW/distance decay z-score, (encoded 1) or did not live
in a cluster of RSOs, represented by a negative IDW/distance decay z-score (encoded 0),
a population-average model was used with robust standard errors to ascertain the
coefficients of the RSO’s and neighborhood variables. For the dichotomous outcome
variables, the statistical model is based on equations presented in Table 6. In the initial
equation, the generated coefficients do not hold any interpretive value. Exponentiated
coefficients, depicted in odds-ratios, subtracted from one and multiplied by 100 signify
the percent change in the likelihood that an RSO will recidivate.
The level 1 independent variables in research question 2 examine the possible
individual-level factors that could contribute to an RSO living within clusters of RSOs.
Sexual predators (encoded 1), as opposed to sexual offenders (encoded 0), usually have
more stringent guidelines on where they can live. The second independent variable
examines if the victim was a minor (encoded 1) or not (encoded 0) as those RSOs with
minor victims frequently receive stricter guidelines on appropriate housing areas. The
third independent variable assesses if the RSO is homeless (encoded 1) or not homeless
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(encoded 0). The fourth variable measures whether or not an RSO violates FLRR
(encoded 1) or does not violate FLRR (encoded 0). The fifth individual-level variable
records if an RSO was rearrested (encoded 1) or was not arrested (encoded 0).
Additionally, a correlation analysis of the variables in regards to multicollinearity and no
issues exist.
The level 2 variables in research question 2 examine the neighborhood-level
factors that could cause an RSO to live within a cluster of RSOs. The first neighborhoodlevel variable of social disorganization, transformed into a z-score, measures the level of
cohesiveness and informal social control within a community and is operationalized as an
interval variable. The second variable measures the total number of RSOs within a
synthetic census tract and is expressed numerically with a range of 19 to 295 RSOs per
tract. The third and fourth variables, coded as intervals, measure the population and
housing density, respectively. Table 7 presents the results of the analysis.
Prior research indicates that RSOs live in socially disorganized neighborhoods
(Clark & Duwe, 2015; Hughs & Burchfield, 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006). Also, studies
show that RSOs living within socially disorganized neighborhoods cause a host of
unintended and collateral consequences including barriers to reentry like forming
prosocial relationships (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2009; Kubrin &
Stewart, 2006), lack of neighborhood self -policing in the form of informal social control
(Bursik, 1988; Greenberg et al., 1982; Kubrin & Wo, 2016), scarce job opportunities, and
scarcity of resources like treatment centers (Lee-Silcox, 2016; Wartell, 2009; Wilson,
2009). In analyzing predators, cases with victims who were minors, homeless RSOs,
RSOs who violate FLRR, RSOs who recidivate, as well as social disorganization levels,
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the total number of RSOs within each census tract, population, and housing density,
research question 2 seeks to understand what nested variables, if any, contribute to
clustering of RSOs.
The Victim is Under 18
Out of the 3,826 RSOs, 78% of the RSOs in the sample committed acts against
minors (n = 2,995). In the current model, those cases with minor victims emerge as
statistically significant (p < .001). Controlling for other independent variables included in
the model, the odds of an RSO with a previous conviction with a minor victim living
within a cluster of RSOs is approximately 11% higher than an RSO with a non-minor
victim.
Transient RSOs
Representing 19% (n = 716) of the total sample, homeless RSOs show as
statistically significant (p = .011) in the current model. Controlling for other independent
variables included in the model, the odds of a homeless RSO living in a cluster of RSOs
are approximately 7% higher than an RSO who lives in a home.
RSOs Who Violate FLRR
Over two-fifths (41%) of the RSO sample violate FLRR, and within this model,
shown as statistically significant (p < .001). Controlling for other independent variables
included in the model, the odds of an RSO who violates FLRR living in a cluster of RSOs
are approximately 12% lower than an RSO who does not violate FLRR.
RSOs Who Recidivate
Signifying 23% (n = 869) of the overall RSO sample, RSOs who recidivate
present as statistically significant (p = .037). Controlling for other independent variables
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included in the model, the odds of an RSO who recidivates is 5% more likely to live in a
cluster of RSOs than an RSO who does not.
Social Disorganization
Within this model, social disorganization measures as statistically significant (p <
.001). For a one-unit increase in social disorganization within a synthetic census tract, the
log odds of an RSO increase by 118%.
Population and Housing Density
Within the model for research question 2, population density and housing density
reflect as statistically significant as p = .002 and p = .009, respectively. However, the
odd-ratio for both interval variables is minimal, accounting for less than 1% of a
difference per unit of measurement.
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Table 6
Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model for the Dichotomous Response Variable (Y)
Hierarchical level

Equation

Individual (Level 1)

Y has a Bernoulli distribution with a parameter ϕ
log [ϕ/(1 – ϕ)] = β0 + β1 predator + β2 victim under 18 + β3 transient
+ β4 rearrested

Group (Level 2)

β0 = γ00 + γ01 social disorganization + γ02 total RSOs + γ03 population denisity
+ γ04 housing density + u0

Note. Βis are Level 1 regression coefficients (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). γ0js ( j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) are Level 2 regression coefficients. u0 is Level
2 random error.
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Table 7
Predicting Clustering of RSOs for Research Question 2
95% CI
Exp(B)
B

SE

t

df

p

LL

UL

Predator

-0.013

0.008

-1.678

3769

0.093

0.987

0.973

1.002

Victim under 18

0.108

0.300

3.604

3769

<0.001

1.114

1.050

1.181

Transient RSO

0.064

0.025

2.534

3769

0.011

1.067

1.015

1.121

RSO violators
of FLRR

-0.126

0.034

-3.693

3769

<0.001

0.882

0.825

0.943

RSO arrested

0.052

0.025

2.090

3769

0.037

1.054

1.003

1.108

Social
disorganization

4.769

0.817

-5.836

47

<0.001

117.818

22.760

609.890

Total number of RSOs
in census tract

-0.005

0.005

-0.917

47

0.364

0.995

0.985

1.006

Population density

-0.001

0.0004

-3.324

47

0.002

0.998

0.998

0.999

Housing density

0.003

0.001

2.727

47

0.009

1.003

1.001

1.005

Individual-Level

Neighborhood-Level

Note. Level 1 units (RSOs) = 3,826, Level 2 units (Synthetic Clustered Census Tracts) = 52. All variables are grand mean-centered.
Cl = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit
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Research Question 3
The third research question analyzes the effect of these residency requirements.
Specifically, it seeks to answer if there are unforeseen and unintended consequences for
the community at large when RSOs are clustered within a census tract in the form of an
increased rate of recidivism. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous and designated
as the RSO was rearrested (encoded 1) or was not arrested (encoded 0), a logistic
regression model was used with robust standard errors to ascertain the coefficients of the
RSO’s variables. In the initial equation, the produced coefficients do not hold any
interpretive value. Depicted in odds-ratios, exponentiated coefficients subtracted from
one and multiplied by 100 represent the percent change in the likelihood that an RSO will
recidivate.
The omnibus chi-square test for the full model is statistically significant
(x2 = 503.724, df = 6, p < .001 ); therefore, the current model with the independent
variables is substantially better than the simple baseline model. Per the Nagelkerke R2
value of 0.188, the independent variables included in the logistic regression account for
approximately 18.8% of the variation in the likelihood of the rearrest of an RSO or
recidivating. While the Hosmer and Lemeshow test for goodness of fit for the logistic
regression model did prove significant at p < .01 (x2 = 21.628), this might be due in part
to omitted variable bias and could be related to individual data not analyzed within the
current model or available to the researcher, such as the measure of self-control, etc.
Additionally, a correlation analysis of the variables in regards to multicollinearity and no
issues exist.
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The independent variables in research question 3 investigate possible individuallevels factors that might cause an RSO to recidivate in analyzing if sexual predators,
those who are homeless RSOs, violators of FLRR, and those who live in clusters
recidivate while controlling for age and race. The first independent variable looks at
sexual predators (encoded 1) versus sexual offenders encoded (encoded 0) as sexual
predators commit more severe sexual acts, multiple times, or on multiple victims. The
second independent variable looks at an RSO’s housing stability and denotes whether or
not the RSO is homeless (encoded 1) or not homeless (encoded 0). Most of the time,
homeless RSOs cannot find or afford a residence outside of the buffer zones dictated by
FLRR and municipality restrictions. Furthermore, the next variable of whether or not an
RSO violates FLRR (encoded 1) or does not violate FLRR (encoded 0) analyzes if those
who violate FLRR are more or less apt to recidivate. Next, since prior literature discusses
the impact clusters of ex-convicts resulting in high recidivism rates within a
neighborhood (D.S. Kirk, 2015) the IDW/distance decay z-score independent variable
measures if the RSO lives in a cluster of RSOs (encoded 1) or not in a cluster of RSOs
(encoded 0). Also, the model for research question 3 uses the control variables of age and
race.
As previously discussed, sex offender residency restrictions like FLRR focus on
keeping children safe by creating buffer zones around places where children congregate
during the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. However, prior research shows that there is an
unintended consequence of ex-offenders living within the same neighborhood in the form
of recidivism (D.S. Kirk, 2009, 2015). Furthermore, subculture theory (Fischer, 1975)
and recidivism studies (D.S. Kirk, 2015) warn of ex-convicts sharing similar interests,
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communicating frustration with law enforcement, and the ease of recruiting and partaking
in illegal activities in socially disorganized communities where clusters of ex-offenders
reside. In analyzing predators, homeless RSOs, RSOs who violate FLRR, and RSOs who
live in clusters research question 3 seeks to understand what individual-level variables, if
any, contribute to recidivism. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics, and Table 8 displays
the results of the analysis for research question 3.
Transient RSOs
Representing 19% (n = 716) of the total sample, RSOs who are homeless appear
as extremely statistically significant (p < .001). Controlling for other independent
variables included in the model, the odds of a homeless RSO recidivating is
approximately two times more likely than an RSO who lives in a home.
IDW/Distance Decay
Representing 24% (n = 910) of the total sample, RSOs who live in clusters show
as statistically significant (p < .01). Controlling for other independent variables included
in the model, the odds of an RSO who lives in a cluster of RSOs recidivating is
approximately 14% higher than an RSO who does not live in a cluster of RSOs.
Control Variables
The control variables of age and race, specifically RSOs who are Black appears as
extremely significant (p < .001). Race, dummy-coded as Black (encoded 1) and NonBlack (encoded 0), which would include White, Asian, and Native RSOs, appears as
statistically significant (p < .001). Signifying 38% of RSOs, Black RSOs account for
1,456 cases of the overall sample. Controlling for the other independent variables
included in the model, the odds of a Black RSO recidivating is 80% higher than other
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races (White, Asian, Native). Age also shows as extremely statistically significant (p <
.001) with a negative linear relationship to the dependent variable. For every one year
decrease in age, the odds of recidivating increases by 4%. However, when looking at this
variable and result, one should take into account that the median age of the sample is 51,
with the age range of the overall sample between 17-years-old and 95-years-old.
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Table 8
Logistic Regression Predicting the Recidivism of RSOs for Research Question 3

B

SE

Wald

df

p

95% CI

Exp(B)
LL

UL

Predator

-0.057

0.130

0.195

1

0.659

0.944

0.732

1.218

Transient RSO

1.128

0.103

120.147

1

0.000

3.090

2.526

3.782

RSO violators
of FLRR

0.140

0.092

2.297

1

0.130

1.150

0.960

1.378

IDW/Distance
decay

0.130

0.045

8.260

1

0.004

1.139

1.042

1.245

Black

0.591

0.086

47.494

1

0.000

1.805

1.526

2.135

Age

-0.039

0.004

125.864

1

0.000

0.961

0.955

0.968

Constant

0.086

0.181

0.224

1

0.636

1.090

Note. N = 3,826. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit
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V.

DISCUSSION

This chapter reviews the objectives of the current study, including the three
research questions and hypotheses investigated within the analysis. Then, the conclusions
and implications of the study’s results are matched to the existing literature and
interpreted. Next, the chapter continues by illuminating the limitations of the study, areas
of future research, and policy implications. Lastly, the chapter concludes with the
author’s final thoughts and calls to action from the academic community and
policymakers.
The Present Study
The current study investigated three different but related research questions to
address limitations with the existing literature on residency restrictions regarding sex
offenders, the unintended consequences of these restrictions, such as the location of their
housing, possible barriers to reentry, and recidivism due to these severe restrictions. The
first research question probed into which RSOs, if any, were breaking residency
restrictions within a snapshot of time during November 2015. The second research
question delved into where RSOs lived as of November 2015, and if they clustered within
socially disorganized neighborhoods. The third question explored the possibility of
whether RSOs clustering and other factors increase the likelihood of recidivation within
three years, between November 2015 and November 2018.
The present research expanded the existing literature in three key ways. First, the
results of the current study revealed that within major metropolitan areas with more
extensive residency restrictions, sex offenders still violate residency restrictions.
Secondly, the findings affirmed that RSOs cluster within socially disorganized areas
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within populous counties. Lastly, the findings revealed that clustering and homelessness
significantly contribute to an RSO’s recidivism rate.
The results of the multiple logistic regression analysis for the first research
question supported the hypothesis that RSOs violate SORRs and the buffer zones
associated with residency restrictions. This outcome further enforces current literature
that residency restrictions, even severe residency restrictions (over 1,000-foot buffer
zones), do not guarantee safety to potential victims. Instead, having these SORRs in place
creates a false sense of security and the illusion of being an effective policy, when,
paradoxically, these policies also increase recidivism. These unintended consequences
create the worst-case scenario for SORRs, go against the goals and objectives of these
laws, and creates severe backlash by increasing recidivism, which will be further
discussed in more detail.
Other states and municipalities experienced the same outcomes as those found in
research question one (Berenson & Appelbaum, 2011; Grubesic et al., 2007; Tewksbury
& Mustaine, 2008), and the findings of the first research question uphold that RSOs
violate SORRs, even in a densely populated area. While Grubesic and colleagues (2007),
Berenson and Appelbaum (2011), and Tewksbury and Mustaine (2008) find that RSOs
violate SORRs regardless of housing availability within these counties and municipalities
outside of buffer zones. Within the studies mentioned above, there is a lack of analysis of
RSO individual characteristics, such as demographics and victim types, to determine
possible causality.
However, this study analyzed RSO’s characteristics and circumstances around the
victim. When controlling for race and age, RSO violators of residency restrictions were
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not transient, sexual predators, or those with victims that were minors. The results could
infer that law enforcement within the study area diligently patrol higher risk offenders,
such as predators, to ensure they do not violate FLRR. Furthermore, due to the awareness
of heavy patrolling and enforcement by law enforcement and the RSO’s individual
attempt to follow SORRs, some RSOs stay clear of buffer zones around protected sites.
The second research question attempted to ascertain if clusters of RSOs lived
within socially disorganized areas. While previous research found that RSOs live in
socially disorganized areas (CDPS, 2004; Huges & Burchfield, 2008; Mustaine et al.,
2006, 2008; Socia, 2016; Socia & Stamatel, 2012) only one study by Socia (2012a)
attempted to answer that question by measuring clustering on a neighborhood-level. The
current study not only looked at neighborhoods, but it also controlled for individual
factors in determining clustering within communities. Looking at individual and
neighborhood-levels nested within a hierarchical linear model adds another level to the
overall literature as the two levels influence each other. Socia (2012a) found that RSOs in
counties in upstate New York lived in clusters when municipal SORRs were over 1,000
feet. However, the study states New York does not have a state residency restriction for
RSOs. When looking at municipalities without restrictions within the study, RSOs lived
further apart. Nevertheless, the present study looks at a tri-county area with a larger
quantity of RSOs (n = 3826) in three counties with a higher average per county (n = 1275
RSOs) compared to Socia’s study, which looked at 53 counties with an average of 125
RSOs per county, and less populous areas.
While other researchers chose to utilize a percentage of Blacks to determine social
disorganization (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson et al., 1997; Socia 2012a), due to
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the demographics and make-up of the study area, this researcher chose not to calculate
race within the measurement of social disorganization. While this goes against traditional
literature within this field and this subject area (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson et
al., 1997), South Florida, in recent decades, rapidly evolved demographically and
presents as an emerging type of metropolitan area with high immigration rates, quick,
upward mobility for immigrants, including Blacks, and urban growth (Broward County
Planning and Development Management Division, 2019; FIU Metropolitan Center, 2014;
Miami-Dade County Department of Regulatory & Economic Resources, Planning,
Research, and Economic Analysis Section, 2016). These conditions, as well as emerging
literature regarding unintended consequences of including race in research discussing
social disorganization and neighborhood cohesiveness, i.e., White flight, blockbusting,
etc. (Meyer, 2000; Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson & Bean, 2006), present an
opportunity for a different approach for the researcher. This point will be further
discussed in the section regarding future research possibilities.
Looking at RSOs and the closest five RSO neighbors present another unique
approach to the measurement of clusters of RSOs. Only one other study looks at RSOs
and their closest RSO neighbors to determine clusters (Socia, 2012a). While that study
took the total distance and aggregated it to the census block to establish clustering, the
present study goes a step further by using inverted distance weighted measures to reflect
the influence on closer neighbors to each RSO. Using IDW operationalized friendship
networks and subculture theory by giving more weight to an RSO living in the same
house or on the same corner as another RSO. Friendship networks posit that close
interactions between neighbors and friends form a stronger connection based on
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proximity. While an overall measurement of the distance of the five closest neighbors
does depict a number, it does not account for influence or ties, nor is it reflective of each
RSO neighbor. For example, an RSO’s total distance to their five neighbors can be ten
feet. Nevertheless, that means that the total can reflect several different combinations.
Possible iterations include: each RSO neighbor can be equidistant at two feet each (2 + 2
+ 2 + 2 + 2 = 10), one RSO neighbor can be extremely far and the others close (0 + 0 + 0
+ 0 + 10 = 10), or two can be further away and three close (0 + 0 + 0 + 5 + 5 = 10), and
so forth (illustrated in Figure 4 in the Appendix). IDW eliminates the guesswork and
weights those with zero distance between the RSO and their neighbor with a higher
weight than a neighbor living spacially further. Through IDW, a clearer picture regarding
the sphere of influence, friendship networks, and subculture theory can be inferred and
explored.
Lastly, the results of the multiple logistic regression analysis for the third research
question supported the hypothesis that RSO clustering would lead to recidivism due to a
lack of pro-social relationships and exposure to deviant subcultures. General recidivism
studies show that socially disorganized neighborhoods with clusters of ex-convicts
contained increased illegal activity (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2009;
Kubrin & Stewart, 2006). Moreover, shared deviant habits (Katz, 1988; Holt et al., 2010;
Steglich et al., 2010) and increased geographic proximity (Ebbesen et al., 1976; Preciado
et al., 2012) help in creating and maintaining friendships (Fischer, 1975). As previously
discussed, the use of IDW for each RSO to determine the proximity to the five closest
RSO neighbors elucidated the possible direct impact of each RSO neighbor, which is
similar to that of distance decay theory.
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The results of this study also revealed that transient or homeless RSOs were two
times more likely to recidivate than those with permanent addresses. This finding speaks
directly to the existing literature discussing either a lack of housing (BTFR, 2009;
Zandbergen & Hart, 2009) or the collateral consequences of RSOs not being able to find
housing (Levenson & Cotter, 2005b; Levenson et al., 2015). These results along with the
increased burden on law enforcement officers and their resources to track RSOs (BTFR,
2009; Monjeau, 2011; Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018) confirm that severe SORRs that
propel RSOs to live on street corners and outside of buffer zones do not serve the public
interest or reduce recidivism. From these findings, one can infer that this type of
banishment and clustering within socially disorganized areas exacerbates deviant
behavior with transient RSOs who have little to lose and act correspondingly (Levenson,
2018).
While the previous literature discussed law enforcement hardships (BTFR, 2009;
Monjeau, 2011; Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018), collateral consequences for RSOs
(Levenson & Hern, 2007; Levenson et al., 2015; Rydberg et al., 2014, Zandbergen &
Hart, 2009; Zgoba et al., 2009), and general terms regarding housing instability and the
impact on recidivism (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2015; Kustura, 2015;
Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009), this study extends the literature further by quantifying the
unintended consequences of severe SORRs by measuring the effect of clustering and
recidivism for all RSOs, including homeless RSOs.
Limitations
This study experienced a few limitations concerning using a snapshot of time,
mixed SORRs within municipalities, the information provided by individuals through law
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enforcement agencies, and missing information from RSOs who absconded. While the
use of a distinct period is commonplace within studies, this study uses a segmented
period due to a lack of previous records of the RSO address list kept by its assigned
record keeper, FDLE. Though SORNA mandates that the state law enforcement agency
keeps track of RSOs, it does not require that the agency to keep records of the RSO list at
any given time. As such, denial of requests for access to previous lists from earlier years
occurred because the records for previous years no longer existed (Missing Persons &
Offender Registration, Florida Department of Law Enforcement personal communication,
October 14, 2016). While the current list states when the addition of the offender’s
address occurred, the address information continually changes and updates. Ergo, the
researcher cannot account for RSOs that previously resided within neighborhoods before
November 5, 2015, or their movements and possible recidivistic activity.
Secondly, for the sake of continuity for this study, residency restrictions deemed
by the FLRR, instead of each municipality, were used to discuss violators to SORRs in
South Florida. Within the study’s area of Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach
Counties, 104 municipalities exist with differing SORRs (see Tables 15, 16, and 17 in the
Appendix). Additionally, within the research period of this study, several of these
municipalities changed their SORRs (Reid, 2014; Weibezahn, 2019). To ensure
continuity, the restrictions outlined by FLRR provided stability to the overall study.
However, using this as the guideline conservatively estimates how many SORR violators
exist within the Tri-County area.
The number of violators of residency restrictions cannot be thoroughly
ascertained, which is problematic. Before SORRs passed into law, RSOs owning property
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in restricted areas were grandfathered into the laws, which means that while an individual
RSO’s address present as violating SORRs, they are permitted to live within these buffer
zones. Currently, the RSO listing does not account for those RSOs who fall into the
grandfather clause of these laws. Consequently, this study cannot discern or exclude these
RSOs from being counted as violators to FLRR.
The reported addresses, especially those of transient (homeless) offenders, change
over time, and RSOs self-report their addresses. The use of street intersections as
addresses and possible missing information from addresses given to FDLE eliminated 66
RSOs from the study as the process for geocoding rejected these addresses due to errors.
While these addresses accounted for only 2% of the overall sample, the ratio of geocoded
addresses to non-geocoded addresses is deemed acceptable when geocoding (Berenson &
Appelbaum, 2011; Clontz & Mericle, 2004; Hipp et al., 2011; Hughes & Kadleck, 2008;
Zandbergen & Hart, 2009). Revamping systems to capture addresses, which would
automatically generate their longitude and latitude, would further future research and
tracking capabilities of law enforcement.
Lastly, this study only used data from a Tri-County area of South Florida, which
limits the generalizability of the study’s findings. These counties contain major
metropolitan cities and possess populations between 1.5 to 3 million people (USCB,
2012). Thus, the generalizability and applicability of these findings are limited to
counties like Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. However, as it pertains to
studying clusters of RSOs and recidivism, a wide gap in the literature exists, and future
research regarding other states would help to validate the findings within the current
study.
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Policy Implications
Several policy implications flow from the findings of this study regarding
residency restrictions for sex offenders. The results of the current study indicate that
severe residency restrictions create clusters of RSOs in socially disorganized areas.
Additionally, due to SORRs, some RSOs trying to abide by the buffer zones end up
homeless. As an unintended consequence of these policies, according to the present
study, transient offenders and RSOs who live in clusters are more likely to recidivate.
Furthermore, other studies indicate that tracking homeless offenders place an
extraordinary and costly burden on law enforcement (BTFR, 2009; MDBCC, 2018).
Consequently, part of the rationale and goals of passing these restrictions, keeping the
public safer, turns out to be negated by the rate of rearrest of these RSOs.
In the broader scope of the literature, the policy implication of this study and
previous research suggests that SORRs need further examination and possible revamping
employing evidence-based research. Utilizing GIS to evaluate affordable housing in
relation to buffer zones presents a critical starting place to reexamine SORRs (Burchfield,
2011; Casady, 2009; Dumanis, 2009; Mulford et al., 2009; Wartell, 2009; Zandbergen &
Hart, 2009). For an RSO to successfully reenter society and diminish the likelihood of
recidivism, finding housing is of utmost importance. As previously discussed, the large
buffer zones within the Tri-County area of this study often severely restrict where RSOs
can live. Coupled with a lack of affordability and a landlord’s willingness to rent to
RSOs, housing becomes sparse, and some RSOs become homeless.
Differing measurements of buffer zones develop into another burden on law
enforcement. In the current study area, a given county may contain a multitude of
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municipalities, all with differing SORRs. Having multiple municipalities pass their
SORRs, and NIMBY laws create confusion and cause law enforcement to decipher which
municipality the RSO lives in and what that city’s buffer zones dictate as being off-limits.
Also, severe SORRs within municipalities either banish RSOs from the area or produce
homeless offenders, which law enforcement officers must check in with those RSOs once
a month to verify the provided street intersection address (BTFR, 2009; Schwartzapfel &
Kassie, 2018). Furthermore, while this study explores some unintended consequences of
extensive SORRs in large metropolitan areas, additional ramifications regarding densely
populated areas and SORRs should be explored.
Lastly, failure to address SORRs and these unintended consequences will further
exacerbate the situation. Since RSOs in Florida stay on the list for their lifetime, any
additional RSO that decides to take residence in the study area must comply with the
SORRs in the county and municipality. As the number of RSOs increase, the housing
situation and chance of clustering also increases. This study’s results suggest that these
compounding actions will continue this cycle.
Future Research
This study provides several avenues for future research regarding sex offender
residency restrictions and the unintended consequences of such restrictions. Further
research regarding homeless RSOs, municipality SORRs, enclaves, changing SORRs,
and further studies regarding social proximity and recidivism provides a starting place for
areas of potential studies. Also, a dissonance emerged among academics within the
analysis of existing literature of social disorganization theory. As there is extensive use of
social disorganization theory within the study of RSOs (Duwe, 2009; Levenson et al.,
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2013; Mercado et al., 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006; Socia & Stamatel, 2012; Wartell,
2009, Wilson, 2009), conflicting views regarding the makeup and calculation of social
disorganization theory need further exploration. This section of the chapter investigates
these areas explicitly.
One area of further study would assess the longitudinal growth and rate of
recidivism of transient RSOs based on residency restrictions in various municipalities. In
effect, studying the rates of homeless RSOs and unintended consequences of SORRs
within cities and towns would directly address one of the limitations of this study. Since
the present study found significance in recidivism regarding the clustering of RSOs, in
particular, transient offenders, further investigation would contribute to the gap within the
literature.
Likewise, a longitudinal study of the RSO enclaves in South Florida might
provide added insight as to barriers to reentry, which can lead to recidivism. Studying
these enclaves would also bring insight to the subculture and social interactions among
this group of somewhat exiled ex-convicts. The exploration into possible blowback of
SORRs and how it impacts levels of recidivism will hopefully prevent other
municipalities from committing actions that would lead to similar unintended
consequences. Moreover, further research of municipalities that roll-back residency
restrictions and buffer zones, the reasons why, and a longitudinal RSO recidivism study
within these areas might assuage the perpetual moral panic around RSOs. Ultimately, a
greater understanding of these gaps in the literature will guide policymakers and the
creation of future laws.
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Social proximity and recidivism pose another area for additional future studies.
While several studies explored the relationship to the initial victim (Colombino et al.,
2011; Duwe, 2015, Duwe et al., 2008), a review of recidivistic RSOs and victim choice
could also prove beneficial. Since SORRs often hinder family support or the ability to
live with family, this leaves open the possibility that it helps curb recidivism by
maintaining a distance between possible minor victims that the RSO knows. By studying
the victim choice of those RSOs who recidivate, this could also help to illuminate other
outcomes to SORRs and fill a gap within the literature.
As researchers, there is a fundamental obligation to objectively report our
findings, as well as an obligation to communicate findings, including those that help
toward eliminating negative, unintended consequences of policy or practice (Williams,
2013). If, while studying and reporting on unintended consequences, our research
becomes part of the cycle of determining other flawed constructs, we are contributing to
the progression of unintended consequences rather than helping to correct them.
Research and world events within the past twenty years dictate that criminologists take
another approach to the utilization of race and ethnicity as markers of inherent
disadvantage. Automatically including race or ethnicity in studies regarding social
disorganization without adequately exploring the history of segregation and
neighborhood composition perpetuates stigmas associated with minorities. This
assumption and practice irresponsibly socially constructs a view of a neighborhood
declining when Black families move into an area, which in turn causes “White flight,”
where White residents move out of a community as Black neighbors move into the
neighborhood.
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Similarly, in major metropolitan areas, such as the study area, utilizing ethnic
heterogeneity as a measure might be conceived as antiquated. While culture does
influence mores and values, people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds can share the
same mores and values. Being born in a different country does not automatically
translate with being in an atypical moral stratosphere. A community’s cohesiveness can
exist if the entire neighborhood comprised of immigrants shares a similar background.
For example, Little Havana, an area within Miami-Dade County, is predominantly
Hispanic, which acquired its name due to the influx of Cuban immigrants in the 1960s
and beyond (Silk, 2015). Thus, if their ethnic heterogeneity is measured based on the
percentage of Hispanics and those that are foreign-born and scaled to other communities,
they would be weighted to be of a more considerable disadvantage, even though members
of the community possess similar backgrounds. The notion that being Hispanic, an
immigrant, or having a Hispanic or immigrant neighbor as being inherently associated
with a negative connotation and automatic disadvantage is problematic for the same
reasons using the percentage of Blacks within an area is discriminatory and fosters
harmful socially constructed views.
Within the confines of social disorganization, an argument can be made that while
the current calculation of ethnic heterogeneity might be outdated, a variable regarding a
mixture of races and cultures within a neighborhood or census tract would help determine
some level of cohesiveness. Within the public administrations of major metropolitan
cities, a diversity index is being utilized (Fischer & Schwieterman, 2008; Lima & Melnik,
2013; Town of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 2017) and explored as a possible
replacement for ethnic heterogeneity in social disorganization. A diversity index is a
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measurement of how many different types of races and ethnicities are within a
community and if these types are shared or related, which speaks to the roots of ethnic
heterogeneity as a concept (Meyer & McIntosh, 1992). A diversity index takes into
account not only the percentage of Hispanics versus non-Hispanics but other race
categories as well to determine its value. Specifically, USA Today’s Diversity Index
takes into account the likelihood of two people, chosen at random, would be of different
ethnic backgrounds. The higher the number on the scale, the more diverse the area is, and
the lower the number, the more homogenous the population of that area (Meyer &
McIntosh, 1992). Figure 5 in the Appendix illustrates the diversity index. Additionally,
other indices (Shannon index, Simpson index, Gini-Simpson index, and Berger-Parker
index) explore diversity measurement as well.
As time passes, metropolitan areas like South Florida with diverse populations
and high concentrations of Hispanics and immigrants will continue to push the
boundaries of cohesiveness as currently defined by the social disorganization
operationalization of ethnic heterogeneity. While these issues might not directly affect
every study, the conversation regarding similar metropolitan areas and the calculation and
operationalization of social disorganization theory requires further examination.
Conclusion
This study examined numerous issues concerning sex offender residency
restrictions and revealed several noteworthy results. Even though this study and those in
the previous literature continuously find a plethora of unintended and collateral
consequences for RSOs, most sex offender policies remain the same. Law enforcement
agencies, the public-at-large, and policymakers need to use this research to make and
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evaluate laws with evidence-based studies to avoid these costly mistakes. Additionally,
the international community looks to the policies of the United States of America and
models some of their sex offender management policies based on those in this country. In
this vein, one would hope that those in the U.S. and the international community would
not succumb to the moral panic created after a triggering event, like a child abduction or
rape. Instead, the media, policymakers, and researchers should work together, while
cooler heads prevail to disperse accurate facts regarding RSOs, study the existing sex
offender laws, seek to apply best practices in RSO reentry, and continue to evaluate sex
offender management policies so that one can avoid unintended consequences and
perpetual states of panic.
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APPENDIX
Table 9
Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s Legal Status Descriptions for Sex Offenders
on Registry
Legal Status

Description

Absconded

No longer residing at the last reported address given to the
Florida Sexual Offender Registry.

Civil Commitment

Confined or detained by the Department of Children and
Family Services under the Jimmy Ryce Civil Commitment
Act.

Confinement

Confined to a state or federal prison facility, county or
municipal jail, or in the custody of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement.

Deceased

Official report and/or document of death received by the
Florida Sexual Offender Registry.

Deported

Officially expelled from the United States.

Released - Subject to
Registration

No longer under any form of confinement, supervision, or
any other court-imposed sanction. Still required to register in
accordance with Florida law.

Supervised - FL
Department of
Corrections

Serving a court-ordered term of community monitoring
under the authority of the Department of Corrections and/or
the Florida Parole Commission.

Supervised - FL
Department of
Juvenile Justice

Serving a court-ordered term of community monitoring
under the authority of the Department of Juvenile Justice.

Supervised - US
Probation

Serving a court-ordered term of community monitoring
under the authority of the United States Probation and
Pretrial Services System.

Note. Adapted from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s (FDLE) Legal Status
Descriptions, by FDLE, 2019
(https://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/sops/offenderSearch.jsf). In the public domain.
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Figure 2
Overview of Sex Offender Registry by Status for Florida, November 5, 2015

Note. This figure represents the total number of sex offenders (N = 67,713) in Florida listed on the registry on November 5, 2015.
From “Sexual offenders and predators by county,” by Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), November 5, 2015.
Retrieved from FDLE (http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/publicDataFile.do).
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Table 10
RSO Study Sample Size by County

Counties

Number of
RSOs

RSOs
Coded

Number of
Census
Tracts

Number of
Census
Tracts with
RSOs in
study

Broward

1157

1123

363

268

73%

MiamiDade

1767

1750

518

383

74%

Palm
Beach

968

953

338

239

71%

Percentage of
census tracts
with RSOs

Total
3892
3826
1219
890
73%
Note. Data adapted from “Sexual offenders and predators by county,” by Florida
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), November 5, 2015. Retrieved from FDLE
(http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/publicDataFile.do).
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Table 11
RSO Study Sample Additional Descriptives
Variable

Miami-Dade

Broward

Palm Beach

Tri-County
Area

1750

1123

953

3826

247

105

120

472

1502

1015

830

3354

1

3

3

7

1364

870

761

2995

1102

1726

921

3749

21

24

32

77

White

1036

657

660

2353

Black

710

457

289

1456

Asian

3

4

2

9

Native

1

5

2

8

Hispanic

664

151

124

939

Transient

395

233

88

716

Violated FLRR

750

490

339

1579

Rearrested

492

212

165

869

Clustered RSOs

458

263

189

910

Under 18

0

0

1

1

18 to 25

25

15

21

61

26 to 35

209

134

122

465

36 to 45

423

254

220

897

46 to 55

477

332

274

1083

56 to 65

335

248

187

770

66 to 75

180

114

91

385

Total number of
RSOs
Predator
Offender
Juvenile
Victim is
under 18
Men RSOs
Women RSOs

76 and above
101
26
37
164
Note. Data adapted from “Sexual offenders and predators by county,” by Florida
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), November 5, 2015. Retrieved from FDLE
(http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/publicDataFile.do).
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Figure 3
Sample Status of RSOs by County

Note. N = 3,826. Data adapted from “Sexual offenders and predators by county,” by Florida Department of Law Enforcement
(FDLE) November 5, 2015. Retrieved from FDLE (http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/publicDataFile.do).
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Table 12
Residency Restrictions for Registered Sex Offenders for Miami-Dade County and its Municipalities
Municipality

City, Town, or
Village

Miami-Dade

County

Aventura
Bal Harbor
Bay Harbor Islands
Biscayne Park
Coral Gables
Cutler Bay
Doral
El Portal
Florida City
Golden Beach
Hialeah
Hialeah Gardens
Homestead
Indian Creek
Key Biscayne
Medley
Miami
Miami Beach
Miami Gardens
Miami Lakes
Miami Shores
Miami Springs
North Bay Village
North Miami
North Miami Beach

City
Village
Town
Village
City
Town
City
Village
City
Town
City
City
City
Village
Village
Town
City
City
City
Town
Village
City
City
City
City

Residency Restriction Requirement
Per Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance - 2500 feet of any school and 1000 feet
from park or childcare center
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
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Opa-Locka
Palmetto Bay
Pinecrest
South Miami
Sunny Isles Beach
Surfside
Sweetwater
Virginia Gardens
West Miami

City
Village
Village
City
City
Town
City
Village
City

2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
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Table 13
Residency Restrictions for Registered Sex Offenders for Broward County and its Municipalities
Municipality
Broward County

City,
Town,
or
Village
County

Residency Restriction Requirement
2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, or playground

Coconut Creek

City

2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, childcare facility, daycare, park, playground or
other places where children regularly congregate

Cooper City

City

2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, or playground

Coral Springs

City

Dania Beach

City

Davie

Town

Deerfield Beach

City

Fort Lauderdale

City

Hallandale Beach

City

Hillsboro Beach

Town

Hollywood

City

Lauderdale Lakes

City

Lauderdale-by-the-Sea

Town

2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, childcare facility, daycare, park, playground or
other places where children regularly congregate
2,500 feet of any school, daycare center, park or playground
2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park (including linear parks),
playground or other places where children regularly congregate
2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, playfield or
sport center
1400 feet of any school, public school bus stop, child daycare facility, park, or playground as described in
subsection (a) or other places where children regularly congregate
2,500 feet of any public or private schools that have students less than the age of 18; designated public or
private school bus stop, daycare center, public park, or public playground
2,500 feet of any park, playground, beach or other public places where children regularly congregate
1,000 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground or any other
place where children regularly congregate
2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare facility, park, playground, or other places
where children regularly congregate
2,250 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, beach or other
places where children regularly congregate
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Lauderhill

City

Lazy Lake

Village

Lighthouse Point

City

Margate

City

Miramar

City

North Lauderdale

City

Oakland Park

City

2,500 feet of any schools, parks, childcare centers, and daycare centers, playgrounds, or areas where children
congregate
1,000 feet of any school, daycare center, park or playground
2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other private
or public recreational facility where children regularly congregate
2,500 feet of any public or private schools that have students less than the age of eighteen (18); designated
public school bus stop; daycare center; public park or public playground
2,500 feet of any school, daycare center, public school bus stop, park or playground
2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, childcare facility, daycare, park, playground or
other places where children regularly congregate
2,250 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other places
where children regularly congregate

Parkland
Pembroke Park

City
Town

Pembroke Pines

City

Plantation

City

2,500 feet of any public or private school, childcare facility, library, park, or playground

Pompano Beach

City

Sea Ranch Lakes

Village

2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, or playground
2,500 feet of any school, designated school bus stop, park, playground, or other places where children
regularly congregate
2,500 feet of any school, designated school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other places where
children regularly congregate
2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, or playground
2,500 feet of any school, designated school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other places where
children regularly congregate
2,500 feet of any school, daycare center, public school bus stop, park or playground

Southwest Ranches

Town

Sunrise

City

Tamarac

City

West Park

City

Weston

City

Wilton Manors

City

2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park or playground
2,500 feet of any school, daycare center, park or playground
2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other places
where children regularly congregate

2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, or playground
2,000 feet of any school, daycare center, park, playground, or other places where children regularly
congregate
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Table 14
Residency Restrictions for Registered Sex Offenders for Palm Beach County and its Municipalities
Municipality

City, Town,
or Village

Palm Beach

County

Residency Restriction Requirement
1,000 feet from any school, park, daycare center, playground, or other places where children
regularly congregate
1,000 feet of any school, childcare facility, park, playground, designated public school bus stop, or
other places where children regularly congregate
None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute

Atlantis

City

Belle Glade

City

Boca Raton

City

2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, private school bus stop registered
according to section 9-103, public library, daycare center, park, or playground

Boynton Beach

City

2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or
other places where children regularly congregate

Briny Breezes

Town

Cloud Lake

Town

Delray Beach
Glen Ridge
Golf

City
Town
Village

1,000 feet from any school, park, daycare center, playground, or other places where children
regularly congregate
1,000 feet from any school, park, daycare center, playground, or other places where children
regularly congregate
1,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, or park
1,000 feet from any school, park, daycare center, playground, or other places where children
regularly congregate
None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute

Greenacres

City

1,500 feet of any public or private school, public library, daycare center, specifically including
residential or home-based daycare operating under a valid city occupational license; park,
playground, community center, day camp, or other places where children regularly congregate

Gulf Stream
Haverhill

Town
Town

None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
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Highland Beach

Town

1,000 feet of any school, designated school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other
places where children regularly congregate

Hypoluxo

Town

1,500 feet of any school, designated public or private school bus stop, daycare center, park,
playground, library or other places where children regularly congregate

Juno Beach

Town

None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute

Jupiter

Town

1,000 feet of any school, public school bus stop or sign, private school bus stop registered according
to this article, public library, daycare center, park, playground, community center, day camp, or other
places where children regularly congregate

Jupiter Inlet Colony

Town

None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute

Lake Clarke Shores

Town

1,500 feet of any school, public school bus stop, private school bus stop regulations according to this
section, public library, daycare center, park and areas designated for use as parks, playground,
community center, day camp, or other places where children regularly congregate

Lake Park

Town

2,500 feet of any public or private school, designated public school bus stop or sign, private school
bus stop (including daycare centers) registered under section 16-9, public library, daycare center,
park, playground, community center, day camp, or other places where children regularly congregate

City

1,500 feet of any school, designated school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground or library

Lake Worth
Lantana

Town

Loxahatchee Groves
Manalapan
Mangonia Park

Town
Town
Town

North Palm Beach
Ocean Ridge
Pahokee

Village
Town
City

1,500 feet of any school, designated public or private school bus stop, daycare center, park,
playground or library
None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
1,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground or
public pool facility
None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
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Palm Beach
Palm Beach Gardens
Palm Beach Shores

Town
City
Town

Palm Springs

Village

Riviera Beach

City

Royal Palm Beach
South Bay
South Palm Beach

Village
City
Town

None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
2,500 feet of any school, designated public or private school bus stop, childcare facility, park,
playground, or library
1,000 feet of any school, designated public or private school bus stop, daycare center, park,
playground, or library
1,500 feet of any public or private school, designated public school bus stop or sign, private school
bus stop (including daycare centers) registered according to section 39-5, public library, daycare
center, specifically including residential or home-based daycare operating under a valid village
occupational license; park, playground, community center, day camp, or other place where children
regularly congregate
2,500 feet of any school, public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground or other places
where children regularly congregate
1,500 feet of any school, daycare center, park, playground or library
None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute

Tequesta

Village

1,000 feet of any public or private school, designated public bus stop or sign, private school bus stop
(including daycare centers) registered under section 54-29, public library, daycare center, home
operated daycare center with a village occupational license, park, playground, community center, day
camp, or other places where children regularly congregate

Wellington

Village

2,500 feet of any educational institution, designated public school bus stop, private school bus stop
designated by a private school servicing Wellington residents or park

West Palm Beach

City

1,500 feet of any school, designated school bus stop, childcare facility, park, playground, community
center, or other places where children regularly congregate.

Westlake

City

None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
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Figure 4
Explaining Inverse Distance Weighted Interpolation

Each RSO neighbor can be equidistant at two feet each (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 10)

One RSO neighbor can be extremely far and the others close (0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 10 = 10)
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Or two neighbors can be further away and three close (0 + 0 + 0 + 5 + 5 = 10)
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Figure 5
Explaining the Diversity Index

75% White, 13% Black, 13% Hispanic represents a Diversity index of .41

75% Hispanic, 13% White, 13% Asian, represents a Diversity index of .41

25% White, 25% Hispanic, 25% Asian, 25% Black, represents a Diversity index of .75
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